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There is a pertinent question to be asked about the value of 
comparative law analyses: Of what value are they? If the only thing we learn 
from history is that we do not learn anything from history, then comparative 
studies that intend to identify differences and similarities in the hope of 
gaining some understanding of how our legal systems function and how they 
could be improved, are fruitless. I do not share this pessimistic view and 
believe that valuable lessons can be learnt from contrasting different 
systems, firstly by learning that certain methods can work under certain 
circumstances, and secondly, by showing that not every successful model 
can be transplanted. External inspiration can never be a substitute for own 
interpretation.  
 
This paper will illustrate the South African and Swiss Competition Acts 
with a specific focus on the public interest consideration common to both. It 
will investigate if and how political considerations enter into the weighting of 
the abstract term of public interest and whether South Africa as the less 
developed country can learn anything from the Swiss system. In order to 
arrive at a better understanding of the two countries’ systems, this paper will 
include a short introduction to the historical development of competition law 
in both countries as well as a description of their respective legislative 
backgrounds. I will then analyse the various decisions, which have been 
handed down by the competition authorities, specifically with regard to the 
public interest grounds inherent in both systems. The thesis will deal mainly 
with South African merger control cases, where the South African 
Competition Act expressly requires a balancing of public interest with 
commercial and competition interests. Unlike the situation in Switzerland, 
there is an abundance of case law on these issues in South Africa. I will 
attempt to distil the relevant discernable rules or consistent approaches in 
both countries’ decisions. 
 
South Africa and Switzerland are very different countries in many 




nationhood and democratic processes. It is in the top earnings bracket of the 
member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), with an average annual per capita income of USD 
33,800.00.1 It is, however, a country with limited natural resources and thus 
very dependent on its services and manufacturing industry. Switzerland, 
geographically situated in the heart of Europe and well known for its 
neutrality policy during the past 150 years, has an economy with a high 
export orientation.2 With a population of 7.4 million and a relatively low 
unemployment rate of 3.8 per cent,3 it contrasts strongly with South Africa. 
Switzerland has chosen a political path that is separate from the European 
Union, and it has used bilateral agreements to gain those advantages, which 
otherwise would have accrued under such inclusion.  
 
South Africa, on the other hand, is a young democracy just coming out 
of a period of political exile. It is a country trying to reintegrate itself into the 
global political and economic society. With a population of 44 million4 and 
blessed with mineral resources, agricultural and manufacturing capabilities, 
it is the powerhouse of Africa.5 Nonetheless, despite these positive 
endowments, the country has battled to overcome the economic legacy of 
apartheid, which artificially skewed the economy in favour of a small white 
minority. Although the country has achieved good growth in the past eight 
quarters,6 these figures are largely domestically driven and have not yet 
made significant inroads into the unemployment figure, which stands at 26,4 
per cent.7 The wealth gap in the country is still dramatic.8 
                                                 
1 Figure for 2004, available under www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sz.html. 
2 In 2004 Switzerland had a trade surplus of USD 10bn with exports to the value of USD130bn against 
imports to the value of USD120bn, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sz.html, 
3 See figures of the Swiss Federal Department for Social Affairs under 
www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/bevoelkerung/uebersicht/blank/wichtigste_kennzahlen.h
tml and link of the Swiss Statistical Office to www.ams.jobarea.ch. 
4 See Statistics South Africa, available under www.statssa.gov.za. 
5 The country’s GDP amounts to 25% of the total GDP of Africa; see South African portal under 
www.southafrica.info/doing_business/economy/econoverview.htm. 
6 See tables of the DTI under www.thedti.gov.za/econdb/resbank/rb6006SK.html. 
7 See South African Statistical Office under 
www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0210/P0210September,March2000,2005.pdf. 
8 The Ecumenical Foundation of Southern Africa reported in July 2004 that 40% of South Africans live 
below the poverty line; the country has a Gini coefficient (a measure of national income distribution) of 






South Africa, which was effectively sidelined from participating in world 
markets during the apartheid era owing to international sanctions, focused 
primarily on strengthening its internal economy, which resulted in big 
conglomerates dominating the industries such as Rembrandt, Sanlam and 
others. With the advent of democracy in the mid 1990s, the new government 
identified competition law as an important tool for reorganising the economy, 
bringing the large black population back into the economic mainstream, 
strengthening small and medium sized enterprises, and improving the 
efficiency of the national economy, which had suffered dearly during the age 
of isolation.9 
 
In 1992, the Swiss electorate decided not to join the European 
Economic Community and thus has also not participated in the ensuing 
political integration steps that have taken place in the European Community. 
While the Swiss government has put its membership aspirations on hold for 
the time being, competition law is seen as an instrument to keep the 
country’s borders open in the absence of political integration, by keeping 
trade free of the artificial barriers that are often erected by cartels and 
market-sharing arrangements.  
 
This paper aims to investigate whether these objectives of advancing 
competition together with the public interest as articulated in the various 
political documents, laws and debates, have been met, by examining the 
jurisprudence of the two countries’ administrative and judicial competition 
bodies. In the case of Switzerland, this paper will evaluate how the public 
interest exceptions as provided by the Cartel Act had been implemented. In 
the South African section, this paper will contrast the legislative background 
and foregoing political debate with cases that have emanated from the 
competition authorities. The paper will thus investigate whether there is a 
discernable effort to promote public interests by means of merger control as 
originally voiced by the political parties such as the African National 
Congress.  
                                                 
9 Eleanor M Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South Africa 





There was much excitement and anxiety before the passing of the 
relevant Competition Acts in these two countries because of their potentially 
far-reaching consequences. In Switzerland, a country accustomed to a 
cartelized economy, many economic players felt uneasy about the immanent 
changes. In South Africa, the change in political power seemed to signal a 
large scale shake-up of the economic order as well. This paper will examine 
whether these aspirations and fears have actually materialised. Have these 




2. Swiss Legislative Background 
 
2.1. Competition Legislation in Switzerland 
 
Four separate acts deal with competition aspects in Switzerland. This 
paper will focus on the actual anti-trust act, the so-called Kartellgesetz (KG) 
or Cartel Act. The other three acts are the Price Control Act 
(Preisüberwachungsgesetz), addressing the price of goods and services and 
administered sectors such as postal services and electricity, the Act against 
Unfair Competition (Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb), 
which deals with the manner and quality of competition, and the Domestic 
Market Act (Bundesgesetz über den Binnenmarkt), which aims to dismantle 
the cantonal barriers that hinder the free flow of services and goods within 
the country. These three acts function complimentarily10 to the Cartel Act. 
For the purposes of this paper and the analysis of the public interest debate, 
a discussion on the influence of the Cartel Act will suffice. 
 
2.2. History of Competition Law 
 
Although Switzerland enjoys a reputation of being a highly industrious 
and efficient nation, for most of the 20th century, the Swiss economy was 
characterised by a system of group arrangements within the various sectors 
of industry. The Swiss economy only recently moved towards a free market 
economy based on competition and away from a system of accepted 
cartelization and organized industry.11 The first Cartel Act came into effect in 
1962. It was influenced by the jurisprudence of the country’s highest court, to 
which I will return later. For a better understanding of this evolution, I will first 
examine the constitutional background in which Swiss competition law finds 
itself.  
                                                 
10 See Art. 3 Abs. 3 KG, which provides for the primacy of competition investigations. 




2.3. The Constitutional Freedom of Trade and Commerce 
 
The starting point for an appreciation of competition law in Switzerland 
is understanding the concept of the freedom of trade and commerce 
(Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit), now referred to as the commercial freedom 
(Wirtschaftsfreiheit), which was first introduced as an individual right of 
citizens in the Federal Constitution of 1874 as Art. 31. Since the revision of 
the Constitution in 1999, this right is now contained in Art. 27. Together with 
the freedom of contract, private autonomy and the proprietary guarantees of 
the Federal Constitution,12 the commercial freedom forms the basis of 
commercial endeavours in Switzerland.13 On the international stage, the 
commercial freedom, as understood and embraced by Swiss courts and 
legislation, is unique. No other traditionally liberal constitution has granted its 
citizens a comparable, all-encompassing right.14 Interestingly, the new South 
African Constitution of 1996 grants its citizens a similar freedom in section 
22.15  
 
How the understanding of this economic freedom has changed in 
Switzerland during the past 130 years, is illustrative of how competition law 
has evolved. Originally, the freedom of trade and commerce was understood 
to be a mere defensive right of the individual against state intrusion. It thus 
encompassed the right of the individual to be free in choosing, accessing 
and executing a profession. It was understood as a right of economic self-
determination.16 This also meant that the right did not have any horizontal 
effect between private individuals or Drittwirkung, as it is known in German 
legal systems.17 Interpreted as it was in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
this meant that private individuals were unaffected by other individuals’ rights 
                                                 
12 Art. 26 Federal Constitution.  
13 Ulrich Häfelin und Walter Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (Stämpfli Verlag 2005), Rz. 
630/1, 185. 
14 Ibid, Rz 624, 183; Giovanni Biaggini in Daniel Thürer, Jean-Francois Aubert, Jörg Paul Müller, 
Verfassungsrecht der Schweiz (Schulthess Verlag 2001), Rz. 4, 780; Klaus A. Vallender, Kommentar 
der Schweizerischen Bundesverfassung (Stämpfli Verlag 2002), Rz. 7, 357. 
15 Iain Currie and Johan De Waal, The New Constitution and Administrative Law – Volume 1 (Juta 
Law, 2002), 381. 
16 Art. 26 Abs. 2 Federal Constitution; see also Häfelin und Haller (note 13), Rz. 628, 185; Vallender 
(note 14), Rz. 1, 355. 




and did not have to respect these rights, neither with regard to others nor 
themselves. It was held to mean that they were not only free to exercise their 
occupation but also at liberty to limit their own freedom voluntarily and to 
curtail the reach and intensity of their economic activity. The Handels- und 
Gewerbefreiheit did not limit the individual’s contractual ability or private 
autonomy. Persons restraining trade were thus perfectly within the exercise 
of their constitutional rights and interference by the state would have been 
regarded as a violation of exactly that right.  
 
In the mid 20th century, however, this view was challenged.18 A growing 
number of scholars supported the idea that the personal liberties granted by 
the Constitution were more than mere defensive rights. The state was not 
simply proscribed from interfering with private liberties. They took the view 
that, in order for individuals to be able to make use of these liberties, the 
state in fact had a responsibility to protect and promote their exercise by 
ensuring that the conditions in society and on the markets were conducive to 
their application.19 This meant that private autonomy could not be abused to 
undermine other persons’ rights to exercise their commercial freedom. The 
new interpretation also meant that the Handels- und Gewerbefreiheit did not 
prohibit state intervention against private restrictions if its aim was to 
facilitate others’ enjoyment of the commercial freedom. 
 
Traditionally, the state was only permitted to interfere with the principle 
of commercial freedom, if it had an explicit basis in the Constitution.20 This 
new interpretation led to the introduction of the cartel article into the Federal 
Constitution as Art. 31bis (now Art. 96 Abs. 1) in 1947 and the later adoption 
of the price control article of 1982 (Art. 31septies, now Art. 96 Abs. 2). These 
two provisions laid the foundation for the new reading of the constitutional 
legitimacy for state intervention in cases such as competition control.  
                                                 
18 Häfelin und Haller (note 13), Rz. 626, 184, with reference to Fritz Gygi who introduced the idea of 
competing interests in formulating economic policy such as export economy policy, agricultural policy, 
monetary policy among others; see also Biaginni in Thürer, Aubert, Müller (note 14), Rz. 26, 790. 
19 Vallender (note 14), Rz. 6, 357. 





2.4. Boycott Jurisprudence of the Federal Tribunal 
 
Swiss anti-trust law has its origin in the boycott jurisprudence of the 
Swiss Federal Court, the constitutional court of the country, long before the 
passing of the first Cartel Act of 1962. That period (from the 19th century to 
the beginning of the 20th century) was characterised by sector arrangements 
and high degrees of solidarity within commercial sectors, and price cutting 
was regarded as a foul practice, which drew the wrath of the relevant 
professional organisations and colleagues. The two leading cases of the 
time illustrate this well. 
 
In 1896, the Federal Court was called to adjudicate the first in a line of 
boycott cases.21 An entrepreneurial baker, Mr Vögtlin, who had quit his local 
professional association, which had enforced rigid price control among its 
members, started offering bread at lower prices. The association decided to 
discipline the rebel by using its market power, and ordered the various Swiss 
flour producers and millers to boycott the baker. It threatened to strike 
dissidents from their list of approved suppliers. Vögtlin managed to obtain 
flour from further afield. This flour, however, was of lower quality and more 
expensive, and led to his clients cancelling the few delivery contracts Vögtlin 
had earned. Vögtlin went to court, claimed compensation and eventually 
won. The Federal Court took into consideration the private autonomy of the 
association and its affiliates, but also accepted that individual entrepreneurs 
had a personal right to practise their profession and that a call to infringe on 
such a right, by means of a boycott, was illegal. 22  
 
In 1960, the Federal Court had the opportunity to fine-tune its 
jurisprudence in the matter Witwe Alfred Giesbrecht und Söhne.23 The case 
revolved around a major glass retailer, who also fitted glass. The co-
operative that controlled the market for window glass in Switzerland declined 
                                                 
21 BGE 22, 175, decision of 30 March 1896. 
22 BGE 22 I 185. 




to grant the retailer Giesbrecht the volume rebates he would have been 
entitled to, because Giesbrecht also fitted glass. The fitting of glass by glass 
retailers was prohibited under the statutes of the co-operative in order to 
protect another sector, the carpenters, who traditionally fitted glass. The 
court held that the Swiss commercial system was premised on a free market 
system without state intervention. It held that the freedom of trade and 
commerce contained in the Constitution, which entitles every citizen to 
exercise his choice of work without state intrusion, also precluded private 
individuals from limiting this right. Each individual had to be accorded the 
right to organise his personal commercial endeavours as he pleased. 
Actions that undermined this right were thus not legal.24 The court 
differentiated between the normal and legitimate right to refuse to deal with 
the specific individual and the concerted boycott effort of the cooperative, 
which sought to discipline the victim and to compel him to act in a certain 
way. 
 
2.5. Cartel Act of 1962 
 
The first Cartel Act of 1962 was still premised on the general 
understanding that cartels were not necessarily bad and that the sole duty of 
cartel legislation was to prevent and combat the most abusive extremes (so-
called Auswüchse) of such behaviour. The text of the constitutional article 
giving the Swiss Federal State the power to legislate in this sector clearly 
stipulated an abuse-oriented approach (Missbrauchsbekämpfung).25 The 
new Act set up a commission that was empowered to investigate complaints 
and which had to balance various interests with competitive influences. This 
approach of only fighting abusive agreements and behaviours, and not 
interfering in other types of restrictive contractual arrangements, has stayed 
with the Swiss system until today. As such, it contrasts with the systems 
prevalent in the EU, Germany and the US, where certain types of contracts 
are prohibited per se and then, by using a rule of reason method and 
                                                 
24 Commercial freedom read together with the right of personality of the Swiss Civil Code (Art. 28), 
BGE 86 II 376/7 E. 4. 




systematic exemptions, agreements deemed beneficial on a balance of 
effects are declared legal (Verbot mit Legalausnahmen, prohibition with 
legally defined exceptions).26 In effect, however, these two systems, due to 
their various exceptions and interpretations, are moving closer together. 
 
2.6. Cartel Act of 1985 
 
The Act of 1985 went on to introduce certain types of behaviour, which 
were seen to eliminate effective competition (wirksamer Wettbewerb). The 
Act was preceded by intense discussions about the constitutional legality of 
introducing a competition system, which would condemn such actions with 
only an efficiency defence as protection. In the end, the majority of 
parliamentarians were convinced that the constitutional understanding 
governing the Swiss economy was one that favoured a freely coordinated 
system of competition above one of group arrangements. The pro-
competition surge, however, fell short of introducing merger control 
provisions into the Act. The feeling was that the constitutional mandate, 
which expressly required the state to fight the negative consequences of 
cartels, did not extend to mergers or provide for their prevention. It was held 
to be beyond the powers of the authorities to disallow a merger pre-
emptively, as this would have been interference in the market structure and 
not concentrated on fighting market behaviour, which would have been 
deemed covered by the Constitution.27  
 
2.7. Cartel Act of 1995 
 
Like the South African Competition Act and the present the Swiss 
Cartel Act of 1995 contains an explicit purpose clause. In contrast to the 
Competition Act, it does not purport to endorse any other purpose than 
competition itself.28 It solely and explicitly aims to combat the harmful 
                                                 
26 EU: EU Agreement article 81 subsection 1 and subsection 2 and article 82; US: Sherman Act of 
1890, s 1 and s 2, Clayton Act of 1914, s 2, 3 and 7 and 7A; and Germany: § 1 GWB. 
27 Zäch (note 11), Rz. 134, 59. 
28 Art. 1 KG; the South African Competition Act also seeks to promote consumer welfare, employment 
and economic welfare, the country’s competitiveness, SMEs as well as the economic reintegration of 




economic and social effects of cartels and other restraints of competition. 
There is no mention of consumer welfare, employment, environmental or 
social concerns. The new Act of 1995 departed from the traditional 
understanding of fighting the extremes of anti-competitive agreements with 
socially negative consequences and introduced provisions to the extent that 
certain behaviour and arrangements would be automatically deemed to be 
anti-competitive, thereby shifting the onus of proof for benevolence to the 
accused parties.29  
 
As in South African law, the Swiss Cartel Act is premised on two 
substantive pillars: Protecting competition against unlawful restraints of trade 
by some arrangement or by a dominant market player, and controlling 
mergers. The Act also includes the possibility of exemptions as does the 
South African Competition Act. The two systems are very similar. One major 
difference, however, is the treatment of public interest grounds, to which I 
shall return shortly. The Cartel Act has recently been amended once more. 
The main body of the Act has remained unchanged from the 1995 model. 
The added refinements are explained below.  
 
2.8. Cartel Act of 2003 
 
The Cartel Act was revised in 2003. Two important amendments have 
been introduced: Whistle-blowing and direct sanctions. These two sudden 
inclusions were prompted by events that made the news in many countries. 
On 17 April 2000, the Swiss Competition Commission released a press 
statement wherein it announced that it had completed its investigation into 
the suspected cartel of the companies Hoffmann-La Roche, BASF and 
Rhône-Poulenc. It had found that these companies had also operated their 
worldwide cartel in Switzerland for the past nine years.30 While the EU and 
the US sanctioned the cartel members with hefty fines,31 the Swiss 
                                                 
29 So-called hard-core cartels, Art. 5 Abs. 4 KG. 
30 See press release under www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/pressemitteilungen/00139/190400-
D_Vitaminkartell.pdf?lang=de. 
31 The European Commission’s fines totalled €855.22m, with the Swiss-based company Hoffmann-
LaRoche having to pay €462m and BASF AG paying €296.16m, EC decision of 21 November 2001, 




authorities were only able to give a stern warning. The companies could only 
be penalised the next time they were caught. Under the previous provisions 
of the 1995 Cartel Act, a company could only be fined for a transgression 
after it had repeated an action that the Commission had previously found to 
be illegal.32 It is no wonder that critics of the Swiss system cynically 
remarked: Der erste Mord ist gratis! – The first murder is on the house! 
 
The amended Cartel Act changed this. Now, ‘hard-core’ cartels (fixing 
of prices, output and markets) and certain vertical restraints are unlawful per 
se and punishable on detection.33 Administrative penalties may be levied on 
10 per cent of the threefold of the annual turnover of the participants and not 
only on a single annual turnover as in South Africa.34 To bolster the 
provision and assist the work of the Commission, parliament also passed a 
new section, which ensures leniency towards whistleblowers.35 
 
With this step, Switzerland has effectively joined the rest of the 
developed world as far as competition legislation is concerned and 
expresses a clear commitment to a free market economy based on 
unimpeded competition.36 The evolution has been completed. An issue that 
is still contentious, though, is the public interest exception. As in South 
Africa, it is a concept that, although most lawyers agree on its importance 
and inclusion in a competition system, many would disagree on its 
positioning and weighting. The following section will analyse how the public 
interest exception is dealt with in the Swiss system. 
                                                                                                                                         
offences and paid a fine of USD500m, while BASF AG paid USD225m, Department of Justice 
decision of 20 May 1999, available under www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/196at.htm. 
32 Art. 50 aKG. 
33 Art. 49a Abs. 1 KG. 
34 Ibid, compared to s 59(2) of the South African Competition Act. 
35 Art. 49a Abs. 2 KG; to date there has been no reported case where the new provisions have been 
applied. This is most probably because there was an extensive window period after the new provisions 
came into effect on 1 April 2004 until 31 March 2005 during which time companies and individuals 
were able to notify their agreements and get the Commission’s opinion on their validity. Many such 
agreements have been evaluated and the parties have done much to comply with legislation. During 
the phasing-in period, the Commission dealt with more than 150 notifications and gave reasoned 
opinions in more than 50 other cases, Competition Commission Annual Report 2004, 2. 




3. Swiss Public Interest Test 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
As discussed, the Swiss Cartel Act has developed towards greater 
compatibility with the law of its neighbouring states. But even with this 
harmonization, interesting differences remain between Swiss and European 
law in general37 and, in particular in the area of competition law. Switzerland, 
as mentioned in the Introduction, occupies a unique situation in the heart of 
Europe without actually being part of it politically.38 While the South African 
Competition Act, in following its EU and Canadian role models,39 has 
incorporated efficiency defences and public interest reasons to 
counterbalance anticompetitive effects into its test, which looks at the effects 
of the agreement, behaviour or merger, the Swiss system has chosen a 
‘two-step-two-body’ approach. 
 
3.2. Role of the Swiss Competition Commission 
 
Under the previous Cartel Act, the Swiss competition authorities were 
required to take into account all possible results of anticompetitive behaviour 
as well as any resulting positive effects in other spheres of society, including 
consequences in the public interest domain. This so-called Saldomethode or 
‘net result method’ gave rise to many difficult situations that were nearly 
impossible to resolve.40 It required competition authorities to be experts at 
determining what was good for competition, and to give an economic 
equivalent value to social and related issues, a task that was complex, 
subjective and often arbitrary. To avoid this bundling of issues, the 
legislature decided to split the duties under the Act of 1985.41 The 
                                                 
37 Swiss law includes strong elements of direct democracy, such as obligatory referendums, rights to 
political initiatives, but also an unusual government of national unity and federation of strong cantons. 
38 Switzerland is not a member of the EU. 
39 Compare Canadian merger rules in the Canadian Competition Act, s 92 Part VIII – RS.1985 c C-34. 
40 The memorandum to the 1995 Act speaks of placing the competition authorities before ‘unsolvable 
problems’, 7; see also Zäch (note 11), Rz. 162, who mentions procedural delays and personal 
preferences of the Commission members as complicating issues. 
41 Zäch (note 11), Rz. 521, 253; Isabelle Chabloz, L’Authorisation exceptionelle en droit de la 




Commission was thus entrusted to adjudicate the competition merits of 
agreements and mergers, while the Federal Council was charged with 
considering public interest grounds. This freed the Commission from mixing 
too many considerations. The substance of the legislation has remained the 
same as under the old Act (Art. 29 aKG), but the structure and application of 
the law has been refined.42 The evaluation of economic and public interests 
is now performed by separate bodies in a sequential fashion.43 
 
The Federal Council, the executive branch of the state,44 is thus called 
to determine whether agreements or mergers that are found to be unlawful 
by the Commission, may be exempted on compelling public interests 
grounds. The Cartel Act of 1995/2003 has thus far not rendered many 
decisions that can assist the legal fraternity in determining the extent and 
scope of the new ‘public interest’. Moreover, the said Act does not, in 
contrast to the South African Act, define what constitutes a public interest. 
Consequently, the jurisprudence relating to the old Act, which demanded a 
holistic balancing of factors, can give some guidance on this question.45 The 
memorandum of the 1995 Act named a few such political considerations, 
including public service delivery, industrial sector protection, regional 
diversity, the promotion of the ability of Swiss firms to compete overseas and 
employment.46 Some of these interests are also contained in s 12A(3)(a-d) 
of the South African Competition Act. The Federal Council can also receive 
some guidance from the policy choices made by parliament in other 
economic laws, such as the Federal Agriculture Act (Bundesgesetz über die 
Landwirtschaft) or the Federal Film Act (Bundesgesetz über die 
Filmproduktion und Filmkultur).47  
 
                                                 
42 Eric Homburger, Bruno Schmidhauser, Franz Hoffet, Patrik Ducrey, Kommentar zum 
Schweizerischen Kartellgesetz (Schulthess Verlag 1996/7 Zürich), Rz. 2. 
43 Zäch (note 11), Rz. 520, 252. 
44 The seven member Swiss executive is a type of government of national unity representing the 
seven largest parties, Art. 175 Federal Constitution. 
45 Interests such as environmental protection, service delivery stability, traffic safety, health protection, 
see Yvo Hangartner and Felix Prümmer‚ Die ausnahmsweise Zulassung grundsätzlich unzulässiger 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen und Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse’, AJP 2004, 1097. 
46 Zäch (note 11), Rz. 520, 252; Hangartner and Prümmer (note 45), 1093. 




Similar considerations are apparent in the South African context, where 
policy decisions in other laws also influence the decisions of the Competition 
Tribunal. In the South African context, however, it seems that the policy 
decisions made in other legislation act more like hurdles in the Tribunal’s 
public interest analysis than as a form of guidance and inspiration. As this 
paper will seek to illustrate, the mere fact that the South African parliament 
has  drafted legislations in a certain domain means that South African 
competition authorities tend to defer to such legislation rather than drawing 
their own conclusions and making bold own decisions. These areas seem to 
be treated as ‘no-go-zones’. 
 
The Swiss competition system entrusts the highest branch of 
government with the delicate duty of evaluating public interests. From an 
economic point of view, legitimising the departure from blatantly sound 
competition findings in favour of public interests is risky and in essence the 
core of a political process. Responsibility therefore should fall squarely on 
the shoulders of those who are constitutionally mandated with carrying that 
risk and with protecting and promoting public interest in general. By placing 
responsibility for these choices at the door of the highest political office, the 
Swiss parliament has managed to give such decisions the maximum of 
democratic legitimacy. The members of the Federal Council are elected from 
the members of parliament in a manner that seeks to give the highest 
possible degree of equal representation of political, gender and cultural 
backgrounds.48 This leads to government being perceived as a balanced 
and representative body rather than as the executive of a winning party. As I 
shall demonstrate later, it is this very question of legitimacy that frequently 
sits uneasily on the shoulders of the members of the South African 
Competition Commission and Tribunal. The Federal Council, with more than 
150 years of experience, is not new to the duty of assuming certain 
adjudicative functions.49 That is probably why most Swiss citizens do not feel 
                                                 
48 See www.admin.ch/ch/e/bk/buku/buku. 
49 Ibid; the first Federal Council was elected in 1848; the Council has judicial functions as described in 
the Federal Law on Administrative Procedure (Bundesgesetz über das Verwaltungsverfahren), Art. 72; 
however, for renewed criticism, especially regarding the rule of law principle, Art. 5 Abs. 1 Constitution 




threatened by tweaking the system of separation of powers in this manner. 
Experience thus far has been positive and the Federal Council takes its duty 
very seriously.  
 
Nevertheless, the introduction of this special and separate test for 
public interests did cause some consternation in parliament before the Act 
was passed in 1995. It was considered a very ‘dangerous article’.50 The 
National Bank, in its submission to parliament, raised the pertinent question, 
why public interests needed to be guarded with the instrument of competition 
inefficiencies.51 It felt that if public interest did in deed need protection it was 
up to parliament to make special statutory provisions to this end. There was 
concern that powerful lobbies would influence the Federal Council in its 
decision-making to the detriment of competition.52 Other concerns ranged 
from formalistic worries about the fact that exemptions would in actual fact 
result in private individuals becoming lawmakers, as their rules for the 
markets were subsequently endorsed by government,53 to concerns about 
the difficulty of reconciling the Federal Council’s sweeping powers with the 
general constitutional requirement of the rule of law (Legalitätsprinzip), which 
demands that the law shall be the basis for any state action.54 In the case of 
exemptions according to Art. 8 and Art. 11 KG, this basis is very widely 
described and open, which is potentially dangerous. Prümmer and 
Hangartner fear that such exemptions might facilitate anti-competitive 
influences by exemption applicants and uncontrollable government 
intervention, especially now that the pressures have increased on 
companies and individuals to comply with the new stricter Cartel Act 
provisions.55 Until 2003, this had evidently not been the case. Experience 
will answer whether the tightening of the competition system will tempt more 
parties to follow the route of the Federal Council exemption instead of 
desisting from anti-competitive behaviour. A similar question could be posed 
                                                 
50 Homburger et al (note 42), Rz. 8; renewed criticism in Hangartner and Prümmer (note 45), 1094. 
51 Homburger et al (note 42), Rz. 8; Hangartner and Prümmer (note 45)‚ 1099. 
52 Ibid, Rz. 18; this is also a concern raised by David Lewis, The Role of Public Interest in Merger 
Evaluation, speech at the ICN Merger Working Group, 28 - 29 September 2002, 3 with regard to the 
South African context. 
53 Hangartner and Prümmer (note 45), 1099. 
54 Art. 5 Abs. 1 Federal Constitution.  




in the South African context: Do merger parties willingly risk presenting an 
anti-competitive merger together with some public interest advantages in an 
anticipated gamble to have it looked on benignly by the Competition 
Tribunal? 
 
3.3. Federal Council Exemption 
 
The Cartel Act allows parties to apply for exemption under both the 
procedures against restrictive behaviour or agreements (Art. 8 KG), and 
under the merger control procedure (Art. 11 KG). One finds similar 
provisions in the South African Competition Act in s 10, which are discussed 
below in section 5.4. Parties may, after the Commission has found that their 
arrangement or merger is anticompetitive and not warranted because of pro-
competitive gains (Art. 5 Abs. 2 KG),56 apply to the Federal Department of 
Economic Affairs to have the arrangement, agreement or merger exempted 
by the Federal Council.57 The application remains an exception, though, and 
behaviour that has been found to be unlawful under the Act will not merely 
be exempted because it is capable to realizing some public good. There 
needs to be a compelling necessity for the public interest to be realized in 
this fashion. 58 Furthermore, not just any public interest ground will suffice. 
Rather, the realisation of such an important interest must outweigh the 
considerable negative effects of the agreement or practice.59 The 
memorandum to the 1995 Act introduced the example of the fixed book 
prices in Switzerland, to which I shall return later in this paper.60 
 
The decision by the Federal Council, moreover, is always limited in its 
duration and may be coupled with conditions.61 It is important to note that 
the Council is not a supplementary instance of appeal, but a wholly separate 
                                                 
56 An exemption application may not be lodged before a negative finding by the competition 
authorities, Art. 31 Abs. 1 KG, but may be lodged before an appeal against the Commission’s ruling. 
57 For a detailed account of the application procedure, see Hangartner and Prümmer (note 45), 1105. 
58 Homburger (note 42), Rz. 20; RPW 1998/3, Ziff. 5, 482. 
59 Ibid.  
60 This sector had been the object of the Cartel Commission (the present Commission’s predecessor 
under the older Cartel Acts) and these arrangements were upheld, see VKK 3/1973, 187, VKK 
2/3/1982, 117, as quoted in BGE 129 II 44, E. 10.1; see also below Chapter 4. 




body invoked for an entirely different reason, namely the exemption of 
unlawful agreements and mergers on non-competition grounds.62 The 
procedure looks similar to the application for exemption under s 10 of the 
South African Competition Act. But contrary to the situation in South Africa, 
in Switzerland it is, however, only possible to exempt an arrangement or 
merger, which has been found to be anti-competitive. The reverse is not 
possible.63 Political institutions cannot be called in to thwart a competitive 
arrangement because of fears regarding the public interest, which would be 
possible in South Africa under s 12A(3) of the relevant Act.64  
 
The fact that the decision by the Federal Council is not subject to any 
court review or appeal is further evidence of its political and not primarily 
legal function. Some scholars have questioned whether this is consistent 
with Switzerland’s obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). The ECHR requires that civil decisions be subject to at least 
one instance of review with full factual and legal competence.65 In the case 
of exemptions under Art. 8 and Art. 11 KG, these decisions are significantly 
different to the more common civil suites. These differences warrant their 
exclusion from the procedural guarantees of the ECHR. Among these 
differences are the standing of the parties that claim public and not private 
interests, and the fact that they can only demand correct application of the 
law, as the ECHR does not give a means to review the mere adequacy 
(Zweckmässigkeit) of the administrative decisions with civil consequences.66 
As these are exceptions to the rule and thus a form of ‘equity’, the 
individuals do not have a personal right, which they could enforce before the 
Federal Council. The opinion in Swiss legal circles and the present 
interpretation of section 6 (1) ECHR by the Federal Tribunal, is that it is 
premised on the so-called ‘protective norm theory’ (Schutznormtheorie). This 
is understood to give a plaintiff a cause of action only in such cases where 
the law invoked in protection of the suite is specifically designed to protect 
                                                 
62 Hangartner and Prümmer (note 45), 1107. 
63 Zäch (note 11), Rz. 524, 254. 
64 Zäch (note 11), Rz. 336, 162.  
65 S 6 (1) ECHR; full text available under http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm. 




the plaintiff or, in cases where the plaintiff is plainly affected more than other 
persons in a similar position.67 This is manifestly not the case in the Federal 
Council’s exemption procedures. To date, this question has not yet been 
tested in Switzerland or before the Convention’s courts in Strasbourg. 
Evidently, no party would claim that the section that permits certain illegal 
arrangements to be exempted under special circumstances at the discretion 





From the above, it is obvious that the Swiss system goes to great 
lengths in order to accommodate public interest concerns in its competition 
system, and that it has found a unique and appropriate solution for this 
country. By streamlining the competition evaluation before the Commission 
and carving out public interest questions, the analysis has become simpler 
and clearer.68 Transferring jurisdiction on public interest concerns onto the 
Federal Council does not only fit neatly into the Swiss administrative system, 
but it also gives adequate weight to such an approach, while restraining 
parties from attempting to obtain clearance for overtly anti-competitive 
applications. The following section will examine the decisions on record, 
which deal with the public interest issue. Has the system fostered a climate, 
which nurtures the public interest at the expense of competition, or have 
these rules made the public interest intangible and hard to promote?  
                                                 
67 See leading case BGE 104 Ib 245, 249. 








In this section of the paper, I will analyse the actual cases on record 
concerning the public interest defence in competition law. Even before 
dealing with the substance of the cases, it is possible to ascertain that the 
provision has to date played a small role in the authorities’ jurisprudence. 
The public interest defence of the Cartel Act has not lived up to its envisaged 
grandeur. No party has yet resorted to applying for exemption under Art. 11 
KG in a merger control case.69 To date only a single case, to which I shall 
turn in the next section, has been brought before the Federal Council with an 
Art. 8 KG application for exemption.70 Certain events of the more recent past 
might bring a new bearing on this situation, however, which is a question this 
paper will briefly outline later. 
 
4.2. Music Notes Case 
 
In the ten years since the provision has been in place, this case has to 
date been the sole instance where an application has been made to the 
Federal Council for the exemption of an anti-competitive agreement. The 
case concerned a restrictive vertical agreement, with horizontal effect, by the 
distributors of music notes, who had agreed to fix the price of their musical 
scores in 1996.71 The agreement was proposed by the largest of the 
industry’s associations, which represented 45 music publishing houses and 
over 160 music outlets. Their joint transactions constituted about 90 per cent 
of all the music note purchases in Switzerland.72 The agreement obliged 
retailers to maintain the prescribed prices, prohibited discounts to customers 
and rebates stemming from parallel imports from across the border and 
                                                 
69 The Swiss Competition Commission has, according to its annual reports, approved, without 
conditions, 164 of the notified 182 mergers between 2000 and 2004, which is over 90 per cent, see 
Commission’s Annual Reports 2000 – 2004. 
70 Price Binding of Music Notes, Federal Council decision, RPW 1998/3, 478 – 483, available under 
www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/00188/index.html?lang=de 
71 Not all retailers supported the system; especially retailers near Swiss borders, who experienced 
competition from foreign retailers, were against it, see RPW 1997/3, 337, Ziff. 23. 




resale, set binding conversion rates for music note imports and imposed 
fines for transgressions. Members not committing to the pricing regime were 
threatened with supply boycotts. 73 
 
The Commission found that the agreement effectively eliminated any 
price competition in this sector, as it stripped retailers of any means to 
compete on price. It thus denied them any bargaining ability with regard to 
pricing, discounts and the like.74 The Commission found that this constituted 
a prohibited practice according to Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG read in conjunction with 
Art. 5 Abs. 3 KG.75 The agreement was declared illegal in September 
1997.76 The Commission demonstrated that, although the agreement was 
constructed as a vertical agreement between producers and retailers, its 
effect was one of aligning all retailers with each other horizontally by 
demanding the maintenance of the same price across the board.77  
 
The producers tried to present a case for the agreement by arguing that 
the system enhanced the musical and cultural diversity in the country. The 
Commission refused to consider this argument. It correctly noted that it was 
not competent to entertain public interest considerations, as only the Federal 
Council had jurisdiction to adjudge these according to Art. 8 KG.78  
 
The producers consequently applied to the Federal Council for an 
exemption under Art. 8 KG on 20 October 1997. They based their case on 
the public interest ground of cultural diversity. They argued that the price 
fixing made it possible for sellers of notes to subsidise scores that were less 
sought after with the higher returns of more popular music, and that this 
enabled the stores to keep a representative selection of notes for sale in 
stock. This was necessary in order to foster a broad and vibrant musical 
appreciation and culture. According to the Association, this would otherwise 
                                                 
73 Ibid, 335/6, Ziff. 9 – 18, 341, Ziff. 43. 
74 Ibid, 336, Ziff. 19.  
75 Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG defines the concept of an agreement and Art. 5 Abs. 3 KG is the deeming 
provision, which concludes that horizontal agreements on price (among other parameters) are 
considered to eliminate effective competition.  
76 RPW 1997/3, 343, Ziff. 56. 
77 Ibid, 341, Ziff. 45. 




not be possible, as in most cases, the disparity between the actual cost of 
procuring the scores, especially from abroad, and their actual return would 
be too great. An accessible and wide selection was, they thus asserted, vital 
for the nurturing of the musical culture in all categories of music, and in fact 
constituted a cultural duty they had taken upon themselves to fulfil.79 The 
Association thus maintained that free pricing would inevitably lead to 
producers limiting their wares to the scores most in demand.80 The 
arrangement thus contributed to the spread of music and access to notes in 
the whole country. 
 
As mentioned previously, an agreement advanced in favour of the 
public interest must not only be conducive to promoting the public interest, 
but it must be necessary and the public interest must be compelling 
(überwiegende öffentliche Interessen).81 The Federal Council accepted that 
the public interest of cultural diversity and musical variety could indeed 
qualify as a legitimate public interest, which might warrant exemption.82 
Despite this, the Federal Council still denied the Association’s application,83 
mainly because the producers failed to prove that the cross-subsidisation did 
actually lead to lower prices for other works and also because, in its view, 
the producers had not sufficiently set out the necessity nor the adequacy of 
the system to achieve the goal of musical diversity.84 The Federal Council 
felt that it would suffice for all scores to be available on the market. It was 
not necessary for every set of notes to be obtainable in a single shop.85 It 
believed that music note purchases are rarely, if ever, unplanned, as they 
are usually made by someone receiving a musical education, attending a 
course or participating in special productions, and not as impromptu buys.86 
The factor of pre point-of-sale assistance was not as decisive as in the book 
market where the situation of a potential buyer wandering into a shop 
                                                 
79 RPW 1998/3, 480, Ziff. 4. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See Art. 8 and 11 KG, ibid, 482, Ziff. 5. 
82 Ibid, 482/3, Ziff. 7. 
83 Ibid, 485, Ziff. 12. 
84 Ibid, 483, Ziff. 8. 
85 Ibid, 485, Ziff. 12. 




without a concrete idea as to what he or she would want to buy, might arise 
more frequently.  
 
Various other factors also made the sale of musical material different to 
transactions in other retail sectors. The Council pointed out that music notes 
were non-perishable and easy to store and handle, and that customers could 
competently be advised telephonically. These characteristics made them 
perfect for mailing and distribution by courier services. The above were thus 
regarded as further arguments against the need for them to be available at a 
single venue.87  
 
The Council also questioned the ostensible beneficial effect of the 
agreement. It concluded that consumers were likely to make their purchases 
from large retailers, hoping that they would have the sought score in stock, 
effectively putting smaller stores at a disadvantage.88 It also felt that the 
existence of the cartel would increasingly prompt consumers to make their 
purchases abroad because other countries offered more competitive 
prices.89 Further, it held that, although it agreed with the value of musical 
diversity and cultural endorsement and the financial viability of burdening 
purchasers of music notes with costs for other scores, which they did not 
necessarily want to buy, it was primarily the duty of music schools, clubs and 
choirs, rather than businesses, to further these causes. The promotion of 
cultural policy was, after all, not the core business of publishers or retailers. 
The institutions charged with these duties were not dependent on all stores 
being able to provide the whole range of music scores.90 
 
The Council summed up its finding by stressing that the valid public 
interest of cultural diversity, which was ensured through a wide selection and 
availability of music notes, was not synonymous with an area-wide sales 
network with retailers stocking all possible notes.91 An extensive network of 
                                                 
87 Ibid, 485, Ziff. 10. 
88 Ibid, 485, Ziff. 10; the Council reinterpreted the arguments of the Association to the contrary. 
89 Ibid; with Switzerland being a small landlocked country surrounded by five other European 
countries, with many major cities on or near borders, this is easier than in South Africa. 
90 Ibid, 484, Ziff. 10.  




music note sellers was thus not required to advance the public interest, and 
thus the conditions for an exemption were not met.92  
 
4.3. Fixed Book Price Case 
 
The precedent set by the music notes case might soon be challenged. 
The so-called ‘fixed book price case’ has recently stirred competition circles. 
The Swiss Association of Book Dealers and Publishers (Swissbooks) had 
issued a press statement in March 2005 that it intended to appeal against a 
ruling by the Competition Commission, which had ruled against its system of 
book price fixing.93 The Commission had found that the applied system 
eliminated price competition amongst the retailers. By prohibiting the 
system, it hoped that the industry would be forced to specialise its 
distribution channels and to develop upmarket traditional bookshops as well 
as low-end discount-type book outlets. The chairman of the Commission felt 
that the incumbent system was antiquated and in dire need of an overhaul.94 
There was widespread negative reaction by members of the Association to 
the Commission’s decision. Interestingly, in addition to the loss of cultural 
heritage argument, the media labour union Comedia also feared the loss of 
600 to 1000 jobs – an issue that, for some unknown reason, was not raised 
again in the decision.95  
 
Although the Competition Appeal Body (Rekurskommission für 
Wettbewerbsfragen) had previously already dismissed the Association’s 
appeal in May 2001 the Association had taken the matter to the Federal 
Tribunal, which had partially found in their favour and ordered the 
Commission to re-evaluate the pro-competitive arguments brought forward 
by the organisation.96 The Commission announced on 21 May 2005 that, 
after re-evaluation, it still found the agreement to be anti-competitive for the 
reasons discussed below.  
                                                 
92 Ibid, 485, Ziff. 11 and 12. 
93 Commission decision, RPW 1999/3, 461; statement of 30 March 2005, see 
www.swissbooks.ch/cms2/cms.cgi?cfg=2&list=id&prm=62&sort=a&tmpl=|archiv_detail. 
94 See commentary in NZZ of 8 September 1999, 19. 
95 Ibid.  





In the German-speaking parts of Europe (Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland), publishers had introduced a system of book price fixing in 
1993, which required its participating booksellers to keep to agreed selling 
prices (the so-called Sammelrevers). The bookshops thus consented to sell 
the publishers’ wares at the predetermined prices, indirectly keeping their 
prices in line with their competitors. The agreement extended to the 
maintenance of duties for re-imports into Switzerland, and dealt with 
permitted rebates and special sales. The agreement also provided for 
arbitration, special audits and financial penalties, which were due to 
Swissbooks, in the case of transgressions. Although the Association had no 
powers to force sellers to join the agreement, a high percentage of the 
German books sold in Switzerland were subject to the agreement.97 The 
agreement thus had international ramifications. Switzerland imports 80 per 
cent of its German books from Germany. The figures involved in these 
transactions are significant. The Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels, 
the German counterpart of Swissbooks, which is also a party to the 
agreement, represents an industry, which annually exported books to the 
value of DEM 350bn to Switzerland.98 
 
The Commission found that the agreement was a vertical agreement 
according to Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG, which aimed to restrain the freedom of price 
and thus influenced competition negatively. The Federal Tribunal concurred 
with the Commission and stated that price is in most cases the primary 
determining condition in the competition amongst goods and that, in the 
present case, where approximately nine tenths of the selection of books 
were carved out of this competitive process, this was to be considered as a 
substantial influence on competition. 
 
Similar to the situation in the Music Notes case, Swissbooks had 
claimed that the fixed prices permitted sellers to provide to the consumer a 
broader palate of choice in literary works, as it assisted in keeping down 
                                                 
97, More than 90 per cent of German text book prices are fixed this way, see BGE 119 II 18.  




costs of publications that were less sought after. It also ensured a denser 
distribution network, as the higher prices permitted smaller bookshops in 
less centralised areas, such as smaller towns and villages, to survive without 
having to battle against the major book retailers, which would otherwise 
have pressed for substantial rebates from the publishers and offered 
cheaper prices. Giving up the system of fixed prices would have drastically 
reduced the chances of selling specialised titles, new books or works of 
smaller volumes. The Association also claimed that abandoning the system 
would inevitably lead to a dangerous concentration process in the publishing 
sector, which in turn would mean that only the big publishing houses that 
specialise in bestsellers and other high grossing mainstream publications 
would survive. The casualties would be the smaller publishers who, 
according to them, were very often pioneers in the field by discovering and 
promoting new authors and who were thus driving innovation in the industry. 
The literary avant-garde would so ultimately succumb to financial pressures. 
The system also ensured that decisions to translate certain works into less 
commonly spoken languages were viable, and thereby assisted the Swiss 
government’s policy of promoting and protecting the four national 
languages.99 Without this guaranteed income, publishers would soon be 
knocking at the door of government to obtain subsidies before printing books 
in less commonly spoken languages. By fixing the books’ prices, the 
Association believed that it was contributing to minimising the state’s 
intervention.  
 
In effect, the Association was trying to convince the Commission of the 
value of a cross-subsidisation scheme for the book publishing sector. The 
crux of the matter was, however, that the parties did not suggest that the 
pricing system actually led to a general lowering of prices. Their argument 
centred on the issue of being able to provide cheaper ‘fringe books’ by 
means of the system, an argument that was deemed insufficient as a pro-
competitive defence as permitted under the Swiss anti-trust system (Art. 5 
                                                 
99 See s 70 of the Federal Constitution, which ensures the right of citizens to converse in ‘their national 
language’ in administrative procedures and requires the state to develop and promote the cohesion 
among language groups and to safeguard the status of the lesser spoken languages (besides German 




Abs. 2 KG). Moreover, in the proceedings before the Commission in 1999, it 
had dismissed this line of argument, as it felt that it did not belong under the 
heading of an efficiency defence but rather under the public interest defence, 
a question, which it was not competent to adjudge.100 The Federal Tribunal 
suggested in its appeal decision that the counter arguments by the 
Association could not be discharged that easily, but that they required closer 
inspection. The court felt that the arguments put forward by Swissbooks 
(lowered production costs, improvement of the products, dissemination of 
technical and professional expertise, rational use of resources)101 needed 
closer examination, as they all could warrant protection from competitive 
prosecution.102 
 
The Commission again considered these arguments in its 2005 
proceedings but came to the same conclusion as in their first hearing in 
1999. The benefits advanced in favour of the price fixing system could not 
be proven.103  
 
The Association had suggested that the price fixing system allowed for 
a better use of limited resources, categorising the literary works of authors 
as such limited resources. In the view of the Association, the system 
facilitated the dissemination of knowledge through books and helped to 
unearth and distribute the otherwise hidden wisdom of society.104 The 
Commission did not accept this argument. Firstly, it stated that such an 
attempt to disguise efficiency arguments as public interest grounds would 
not be accepted, as the Cartel Act clearly separated the two interests. 
Secondly, it dealt the defence a harsh blow when it likened it to the 
arguments put forward in favour of pro-efficiency considerations, which the 
Commission had already discounted.105 
 
                                                 
100 See RPW 1999/3, Ziff. 94, 461. 
101 Art. 5 Abs. 2 lit. a KG. 
102 See BGE 129 II 45, E. 10.2., E. 10.3.1, E.10.3.2 and E. 10.4. 
103 Commission’s order of 21 May 2005, Ziff. 167, 65, available under. 
www.weko.admin.ch/publikationen/pressemitteilungen/00225/300305-PC-Buch-D.pdf?lang=de 
104 Ibid, Ziff. 191, 73. 




Nonetheless, despite these setbacks, Swissbooks seems adamant to 
fight all the way. The Commission is expecting them to apply for an 
exemption eventually.106 In its order, the Commission expressly reiterated 
that its decision was a purely competitive analysis and that it did not include 
cultural or educational deliberations.107 These were reserved for the 
adjudication by the Federal Council. It is interesting to note that Swissbooks’ 
chances of succeeding before the Council might be better than those of their 
music colleagues in the case discussed previously. In the judgement of the 
Council against the music publishers, the Council noted that the reasons 
advanced for the pricing regime of the notes compared unfavourably with the 
similar system used by the book publishers, as in the latter case the need for 
closer client-to-seller contact and thus a greater selection of goods could be 
established.108 In the opinion of the Council, music notes are hardly ever 
required at short notice or by an inexperienced buyer. Books, however, 
could fall in this category. The same had not been convincingly argued for 




Looking at these decisions and considering the fact that the Swiss law 
has given rise to so few cases under the public interest exemption 
provisions, it would seem that these sections of the Swiss law are not of any 
real practical importance. The Federal Council exemption solutions are not 
something that entities would primarily aspire to, as they are limited in 
application and duration, in addition to the fact that they involve a further 
administrative procedure with further delays and uncertainties, which are 
major negative factors in commercial transactions. The Swiss system has 
created a delicate and well-balanced system to deal with the complex 
questions of evaluating such conflicting objectives, such as competitive 
markets and public interests, and has entrusted the highest political authority 
to adjudge the most important of these questions. Despite this, the practical 
                                                 
106 Annual Report of the Competition Commission 1999, 9. 
107 As in the line of media merger cases, where the arguments of newspaper diversity were also not 
heard due to their public interest content, RPW 1997/1, 179 and RPW 1998/140.  




results seem to indicate that companies and merger participants either 
distrust the public interest exemption as a means of keeping anti-competitive 
practices and mergers, or that they are content to arrange their transactions 
in a pro-competitive manner.  
 
This would indicate that, even for economies that have a history of 
concentration there might be a natural inclination to change for ‘the better’ 
under the sustained pressure of competition law. It would seem that, by 
making the public interest exemption elusive, competition could be 
promoted. This finding puts the expectations for the South African economy 
in a new light. It would seem to support the growing recognition of the role 
that competition law is starting to play in the world’s economic systems, and 
a mounting awareness of the need for economic players to comply with 
these rules. The following chapter will analyse this question and aims to 
answer whether competition legislation in South Africa has delivered on its 





5. South African Legislative Background 
 
5.1. Competition Legislation in South Africa 
 
South African courts have also found themselves resolving disputes 
turning on the issues of contractual loyalty and restraints of trade, similar to 
the situation faced by the courts in Switzerland. Before the Competition Act 
of 1979 came into effect, South African jurisprudence was influenced by 
these two opposing principles. The distinction was drawn between, on the 
one hand, restrictions on the freedom to trade, which were considered 
legal,109 as they functioned as ancillary restraints, and on the other hand, the 
illegal restraints of trade.110 To understand the evolution that South African 
anti-trust law has undergone, it is necessary to highlight some of the more 
decisive events in the country’s political and economic development.111 
 
5.2. South African Act of 1955 
 
The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act No 24 of 1955 was the 
first attempt of the legislature to deal with the issues of competition. The Act 
established the Board of Trade and Industry, which investigated 
monopolistic market situations and evaluated them with regard to the effect 
on the public interest and recommended remedies to the minister,112 who 
could order arrangements to be changed at his discretion. Like the earlier 
Swiss Acts, the South African Act also only dealt with ‘monopolistic 
conditions’ and did not apply to mergers. As the Act only put in place the 
institutions dealing with monopolies and contained no per se prohibitions, it 
also had no direct impact on the behaviour of economic players, which is 
another similarity with earlier Swiss rules. In reality, the effects of the Act 
                                                 
109 Martin Brassey, John Campbell, Robert Legh, Charles Simkins, David Unterhalter, Jerome Wilson, 
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110 Ibid, 61. 
111 For a more comprehensive summary, see DTI, The Evolution of Policy in South Africa – Proposed 
Guidelines for Competition Policy, 27 November 1997, chapter 3, hereinafter ‘the DTI Guidelines’. 




were minimal. A mere six of the eighteen investigations ordered actually 
ended with arrangements between the minister and the parties.113  
 
5.3. The South African Act of 1979 
 
The Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979 aimed 
to deal with the shortcomings of the previous act and was the main 
competition instrument until the present Act of 1998. The 1979 Act 
established a new body charged with investigating competition concerns 
called the Competition Board. The public interest test under that Act was 
similar to the considerations we find today under the 1998 Act.  
 
Similar to the Act of 1955, the new Act of 1979 again limited the Board 
to an investigative role and empowered only the minister to order 
changes.114 Restrictive arrangements were deemed to be in the public 
interest and the Competition Board had to prove that the opposite was in fact 
true, while in the case of monopolistic markets the burden of proof was on 
the parties. They had to justify why monopolies were in the public interest.115 
Even though the new Act advanced competition jurisprudence in South 
Africa, there was still scope for improvement and more active intervention.116 
 
5.4. Background to the new Competition Act of 1998  
 
The economic situation of South Africa in the late 1980s and early 
1990s was characterised by high concentration through a few big 
conglomerate corporations.117 Existing legislation effectively excluded the 
majority of the population from participating in politics and the economy, and 
marginalised small businesses. International sentiment towards the 
apartheid government had furthermore led to disinvestment in the country, 
                                                 
113 Ibid, 66. 
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civil and industrial unrest and macroeconomic instability. The new ANC-led 
government was looking to change this.118 
 
The 1955 Freedom Charter already expressly demanded that ‘the 
national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be 
restored to the people’.119 In May 1992, the ANC drafted its Policy 
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa. With regard to the envisaged 
competition policy, the text stated: 
 
‘the concentration of economic power in the hands of a few 
conglomerates has been detrimental to balanced economic 
development in South Africa. The ANC is not opposed to large 
firms as such. However, the ANC will introduce anti-monopoly, 
anti-trust and mergers policies in accordance with international 
norms and practices, to curb monopolies, continued domination 
of the economy by a minority within the white minority and 
promote greater efficiency in the private sector.’120  
 
It seemed clear from such statements that the new competition 
instruments were designed to break the economic stranglehold of the old 
guard and to launch the slow moving economic behemoth towards the 21st 
century. 
 
The Reconstruction and Development Program of the new government 
recalled the need for comprehensive reconstruction of the South African 
economy.121 It stated the need to introduce stringent anti-trust rules to 
increase competitiveness122 and to prevent market domination and abuse, 
as well as to promote consumer protection and discourage the existing 
pyramid structures, which had dominated the South African economy.123 The 
                                                 
118 See RDP, para 4.1.5 and 4.1.6; Hartzenberg (note 117), 1 and 3; Brassey et al (note 109), 88.  
119 Text of the Freedom Charter available under www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html.  
120 See Ready to Govern – ANC Policy Guidelines for a democratic South Africa, 28 – 31 May 1992, 
section D.2, document available under www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html. 
121 See section 4.1.1 of the RDP, available under www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/rdp/rdp4.html#4.1. 
122 Section 4.4.2.2 RDP.  




document envisaged the setting up of a commission, which would ‘review 
the structure of control’ of the domestic economy in order to spread control 
more widely.124 At the onset, there was no doubt considerable political 
momentum to make use of competition law, together with other policy 
instruments, to further the public interests listed in the RDP. The section on 
competition policy was adopted by government and parliament in the White 
Paper on Reconstruction and Development in 1994,125 and formed the basis 
of the Growth Employment and Redistribution macroeconomic policy of 
government in 1996, thereby effectively ending any radically socialist ideas 
of the ANC.126 
 
5.5. Precursors to the new Competition Act 
 
In 1997, the Department of Trade and Industry published its Proposed 
Guidelines for Competition Policy,127 which were incorporated into the 1998 
Competition Bill by government. These Guidelines already embraced a more 
traditional competition orientation, and stated that the ‘overriding goal is to 
achieve a more effective economy in South Africa’.128 They echoed the 
sentiment of a report commissioned by the DTI two years earlier:  
 
‘one should guard against attempting to use competition policy to 
attain social, redistributive or development objectives that are not 
directly linked to the state of competition and may better be 
served by other types of policies.’129  
 
From this short statement, it becomes apparent that the political energy 
of the policy papers had not survived unscathed. This is a stance the Tribunal 
was to embrace frequently in its later jurisprudence. The Tribunal is in good 
company though. Furse shares this view:  
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128 Ibid, para 1.1.3; see also Fox (note 9), on the standard content of the new act, 585. 
129 Unpublished report by C V N Fourie, D Lewis and W J Pretorius, Towards Competition Policy 





‘There is no reason why tools of competition law cannot be used 
in support of wider social objectives, such as income 
redistribution, but the efficiency of any such move must be 
doubted. It is unlikely that the application of a sophisticated, and 
therefore costly, competition law can be more effective in this 
area than the imposition of, say, a windfall tax on monopoly 
profits.’130 
 
The Guidelines did, nevertheless, contain some strong language and 
advocated that ‘competition policy can assist the objectives of empowerment 
policy. Excessive concentrations of power can be broken up and in the 
process empowerment can be strengthened.’131 The Guidelines also 
contested that the legacy of apartheid could ‘gradually be rectified in part 
through competition policy’ and ‘[i]t is therefore crucial that all government 
policies – including competition policy – are aligned so as to reduce the 
uneven development, inequality and absolute poverty, which are so 
prevalent in South Africa.’132 The Guidelines even spoke about involuntary 
divestiture,133 something big business in South Africa was understandably 
worried about.134 Chapter 4.3 of the Guidelines expressed the government’s 
dedication  
 
‘to actively strive for a “level playing field” but [it] will recognise 
that, in order to overcome distortions generated by past policy 
interventions, it will be obliged to support sectors and clusters 
effectively discriminated against by past policies.’ 
 
On the other hand, the document made it very clear that, in the view of 
the DTI, there was no room for a revolution. In the section dealing with the 
definition of the public interest, it stated unequivocally that  
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‘we have to address some misconceptions about public interest 
that may have already arisen. The Guidelines are not aimed at 
the direct or blanket control of the absolute size of enterprises, 
the prohibition of mergers and acquisitions in concentrated 
industries, the enforced unbundling or divestiture of vertically-
integrated corporate ownership or the existence per se of 
monopolies, oligopolies and cartels, even though all these 
aspects are highly relevant for competition policy.’135  
 
The Guidelines stressed the importance of striking the correct balance 
between competitiveness and development. This included promoting such 
interests as macroeconomic harmonisation, empowerment, employment and 
consumer welfare in complementarity to competitiveness.136 All this 
deliberation and background information eventually culminated in the 
passing of the Competition Act No 89 of 1998, in effect since the beginning 
of September 1999 and which has been amended on three further occasions 
since then.  
 
5.6. Competition Act of 1998 
 
The present Act is founded on the traditional pillars of competition law: 
addressing restrictive practices, the abuse of dominance and merger 
control.137 The Commission must be notified of mergers, if the turnover of 
the parties exceeds certain thresholds. Large mergers are then referred to 
the Tribunal with a recommendation by the Commission.138 Mergers that 
have been found to be either competitive or anti-competitive still have to 
pass the public interest hurdle of s 12A(3). Hartzenberg describes the 
uniqueness of the Act as the unusual mix of ‘equity and justice balanced with 
traditional economic efficiency concerns.’139  
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For restrictive practices the Act has a special exemption section, which 
frees certain agreements from the prohibitions of chapter 2, if they are 
required to meet one of the objectives of s 10(3)(b) of the Act. These 
objectives include the promotion and maintenance of exports, the support of 
small and medium sized enterprises and businesses operated by previously 
disadvantaged persons, or industrial sector protection.140 The Commission 
has granted this exemption on two published occasions.141 In both cases, 
the exemptions concerned state-owned enterprises. In the one, the national 
airline South African Airways and the Australian airline Qantas had applied 
for exemption for their code-sharing agreement.142 The other exemption 
concerned SASOL, the state-owned liquid fuel company.143 The underlying 
reason for these exemptions is similar to the grounds advanced in this 
regard in Switzerland. The policy goal of efficient competition is not a 
singular objective, but it may be trumped by other ‘higher priorities’.144 
 
As the evidence suggests, it would seem that this section of the Act has 
to date played only a limited role. The rest of this paper will therefore focus 
on the public interest debate and the decisions, which have accompanied 
the merger control cases before the Competition Tribunal in South Africa. 
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The focus of the work of the South African Competition Commission 
has been the implementation of the merger rules of chapter 3 of the 
Competition Act. The Commission submits large mergers to the Competition 
Tribunal for approval.145 According to the Tribunal’s annual reports, it has to 
date evaluated 213 large mergers, 189 of which have been approved 
unconditionally, 20 of which have been approved with conditions, and only 
four of which have been disallowed.146 In other words, the overwhelming 
majority of submitted mergers have passed the Tribunal’s evaluation without 
great difficulty. 
 
The Tribunal evaluates the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the 
proposed mergers. The Commission and Tribunal become active if the 
merger is ‘likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition’, s 12A(1).147 
Thereafter, the Tribunal moves to the second part of the analysis and 
concerns itself with the effect of the merger on the public interests, as 
defined in s 12A(3)(a-d) of the Act. This public interest test is thus conducted 
through the ‘filter of a completed competition finding’, as explained by the 
Tribunal’s chairperson.148 Interestingly, the public interest evaluation must be 
undertaken by the Tribunal regardless of the outcome of the competition 
analysis.149 This means that both competitive as well as anti-competitive 
mergers face the final hurdle of public interest scrutiny. ‘The public interest 
can operate either to sanitise an anticompetitive merger or to impugn a 
                                                 
145 S 14A(1).  
146 Annual Report of the Competition Commission 2003/4, 15. 
147 The Swiss Commission only gets involved if it believes the merger ‘creates or strengthens a 
dominant position as a result of which effective competition can be eliminated’, Art. 10 Abs. 2 KG, ie 
their intervention starts at a later, more concentrated stage.  
148 Lewis (note 52), 3; Kenneth Creamer described this approach as promoting the weighing up of 
‘static competition objectives against the more dynamic objectives of industrial and development 
policy’, Challenges of the New Competition Law, in South African Mercantile Law Journal (1999), 342, 
at 352; see also Hartzenberg (note 117), 13. 
149 The public interest is not defined in the Competition Act, and neither do the DTI Guidelines (note 
111) give any weighting; see also OECD Global Forum on Competition, Competition Law and Policy in 




merger found not to be anticompetitive’.150 This contrasts strongly with the 
approach in Switzerland. Under Swiss merger law, once a merger has been 
found to be harmless from a competition point of view, the investigation 
ends. There is no basis for parties or other complainants or indeed 
government to enter into the fray and to demand a public interest inquest 
and find the transaction wanting in that regard. 
 
In contrast to other countries, in South Africa, then, the public interest 
test is not read into the evaluation of the mergers. Neither is it suppressed or 
separated from the procedure.151 It is expressly mentioned in the Act.  
 
The Tribunal can look back on nearly six years of experience in this 
field. Even after this time its chairperson explained that the Tribunal had not 
developed anything near a magical formula for finding ‘the elusive balance 
between public interest and competition’, but rather that it had found some 
‘rules of thumb’ to guide their way. They had grown to treating the public 
interest test with ‘wary respect’.152 It had, according to him, the reverence of 
younger generations, but also the potential to rip apart old structures, which 
had grown rigid and blind. The chairperson readily conceded that it would 
remain impossible to ‘ever eliminate an element of pure judgement that 
inevitably constitutes part of all public interest assessments’.153 The well-
known paradox that markets need to be regulated for them to be free,154 
requires carefully judged balancing of differing issues. This is complicated by 
the fact that the people in charge ‘must employ norms and standards that 
are value-laden and frequently incommensurable.’155  
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6.2. Composition of the Authorities and the Transformation of the Judiciary 
 
The way in which the South African Competition Act is structured and 
envisioned to function, leads to the outcome that, in evenly matched 
situations, when a merger is deemed to be neither obviously anticompetitive 
nor overtly pro-competitive, it is the subjective, ‘value-laden’ opinion of those 
persons sitting on the decision-making bench who will ultimately determine 
the outcome most compatible with their own conviction. Sympathy for the 
cause will eventually sway the pendulum either towards a more extensive 
interpretation of the public interest or toward a more traditional limited 
approach. This point, however, opens a different and equally contentious 
question in the South African context: The composition of the judicial branch. 
A detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, 
however, undeniable that, at least when viewed from the outside, this 
question could have an influence on the reading of public interest questions 
and the extent to which the competition authorities are willing to use the 
instrument of the Competition Act to transform the country’s ‘economic’ 
society. A few brief observations are warranted. 
 
In the United States, the electorate has grown accustomed to the 
influence and consequences of the presidential power to appoint, among 
others, the Supreme Court judges and thereby sway the either republican or 
democratic leaning of the bench.156 In South Africa, in contrast, the debate 
on ‘transformation in the judiciary’, old judges and racism on the bench, is 
still very recent, delicate and controversial with the potential for far-reaching 
and disruptive consequences.  
 
The ANC had already proposed what it envisioned as the way to 
correct the legal system of South Africa in its 1991 Constitutional Principles 
for a Democratic South Africa. Here it stated under the heading of 
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‘Administration of Justice’ that ‘[w]ithout interfering with its independence […] 
the judiciary shall be transformed in such a way as to consist of men and 
women drawn from all sectors of South African society.’157 In January 2005, 
the ANC defended its stance on the need for the South African judiciary to 
transform. Referring both to the above Policy Guidelines and the 
Constitutional Principles, as well as its resolution at the party’s 2002 
Stellenbosch conference, where it promised ‘to expedite the transformation 
of the judiciary, to create a more representative, competent, sensitive, 
humane and responsive judiciary’, it vowed to rise to the  
 
‘important challenge to transform the collective mindset of the 
judiciary to bring it into consonance with the vision and aspirations 
of the millions who engaged in struggle to liberate our country from 
white minority domination. The reality can no longer be avoided that 
many within our judiciary do not see themselves as being part of 
these masses, accountable to them, and inspired by their hopes, 
dreams and value systems. If this persists for too long, it will 
inevitably result in popular antagonism towards the judiciary and 
our courts, with serious and negative consequences for our 
democratic system as a whole.’158 
 
This is strong language, which strikes fear into the hearts of those who 
hold the separation of powers holy, and questions the sanctity of judicial 
independence. The opposition party has strongly condemned the route 
suggested by the ANC despite agreeing, in principle, with the objective of 
making the judiciary more inclusive.159 
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Whether the accusations of racism and judicial resistance are of merit 
is not directly relevant for the purposes of this examination. What one can 
conclude, however superficial the finding might be, is that the bodies 
charged with implementing public interests in competition authorities are 
reasonably well diversified from an equity160 point of view. While 50 per cent 
of the Tribunal’s members consist of persons from previously disadvantaged 
groups,161 the Commission is made up of 70 per cent of previously 
disadvantaged persons and has a gender split of 54 per cent female to 46 
per cent male employees.162 The Competition Appeals Court is made up of 
seven members, of which four are from previously disadvantaged 
backgrounds.163 The argument that public interests are not promoted with 
enough vigour, a tentative conclusion this paper debates, because of the 
composition of the implementing bodies is, at least at first glance, 
unwarranted. If we can thus conclude that the race mix at the Commission 
and the Tribunal does not have a direct bearing on the development of the 
public interest, there must be different reasons for the conservative 
judgements of the body. 
 
6.3. Competition and Equity – a Challenging Balancing Act 
 
The South African authorities are well aware of the sheer impossible 
task of correctly balancing the two opposing interests of competition and 
policy concerns. The consensus is that public interest grounds complicate an 
otherwise pure competition analysis.164 The Tribunal, however, admits that 
‘in the real world […] we have little choice but to grapple with public interest 
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considerations.’165 Fox sums it up neatly by saying that the structure and 
exceptions of the Act ‘imply that South Africans are sometimes willing to pay 
a supra-competitive cartel price for goods and services as a cost of 
advancing the critical effort to bring more of the historically excluded 
population into the economic mainstream.’166 Given the historical, political 
and economic background of South Africa, the Tribunal notes that it would 
render itself and the other competition authorities useless and deluded, if 
they would not take into consideration the effects of their decision-making 
on, for instance, employment in a country suffering from crippling 
joblessness or to ignore the results of merger cases on the participation of 
historically disadvantaged persons in the economy.167 They would soon find 
themselves discredited and disregarded, something that all parties 
concerned are intent on avoiding.  
 
There seems to be a strong commitment in the Tribunal to express the 
public interest in its jurisprudence. ‘No public agency that relies on public 
support can escape the influence of a strongly held public interest’ is how 
the Tribunal puts it.168 Worded in this fashion, it sounds nearly like a 
resignation to the overwhelming weight of the public interest. It would seem 
as if there is a compelling force, which presses for the advancement of the 
public interest. The facts, as we shall see later, however, belie this 
statement. The apparent fissure forced into the solid and economically 
sound bastion of competition analysis is very much contained in South 
Africa. Firstly, as the Tribunal explains itself, the public interest grounds are 
not ‘infinitely elastic’ but must fit into the definitions of the Act.169 Secondly, 
the ‘primacy of the competition evaluation’ is underlined through the mere 
structure of the Act, seen that it precedes any public interest evaluation.’170  
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6.4. Role of the Commission 
 
In contrast to the Swiss system, in South Africa it is the same authority, 
which performs the competitive and public interest test. This can be either 
advantageous or difficult, depending on the developmental status of the 
country concerned. The Competition Tribunal favours a unified body 
approach for a country such as South Africa.171 One of the arguments 
advanced is the need for the executive to define and implement industrial 
policy during the early stages of a country’s development in order to 
strengthen selected sectors or interest groups.172  
 
By not splitting the decision-maker into separate bodies, one dealing 
with competition questions and another dealing with public interest issues as 
in Switzerland and not permitting a ministerial override as before,173 the 
South African system has three perceived advantages: Firstly, the decision-
making body is always in touch with the competition implications of its 
decisions. Public officials might be tempted to give too much weight to social 
interests, especially in a country with a young competition system where an 
understanding and appreciation of the careful balance between competition 
and policy might not yet have permeated all spheres of government. 
Secondly, the Competition Tribunal holds its sessions in public and thus 
avoids the danger of lobbying behind the scenes. Decisions are published 
and thus develop competition jurisprudence, while at the same time 
educating legal practitioners in this still young and evolving field of law, 
which is particularly relevant in a developing country such as South Africa. 
Finally, the unified body approach enhances the standing of the Tribunal and 
its independence if its decision cannot be overthrown at a political whim for 
reasons of political expediency.174  
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Considering that all four of the public interests enumerated in the 
Competition Act require political attention, it makes sense to strengthen the 
body charged with their promotion. The important question is, whether these 
aims have actually been achieved. Bearing in mind the diversity of the four 
interests, there would be wide scope for jurisprudential evolvement. Not only 
the listed interests in s 12A(3), but also the Preamble and the Purpose 
Clause of Act allow for further interpretation. The DTI was already well 
aware of these challenges. Recognising that the ‘key to understanding of 
public interests in economic policy is the combination of competitiveness and 
development’, it also realised that being able to sufficiently serve both 
objectives would prove to be a ‘momentous challenge’.175 Nevertheless, the 
Guidelines clearly stated government’s commitment to addressing both key 
issues in a commensurate manner. South African competition policy is 
unique in its blend of aspects and rests on several policy pillars.176 The 
public interest is clearly defined with reference to both competitiveness and 
development. The former requires sound competition analysis and strict 
application of generally accepted antitrust standards. The latter requires 
combating the past inequalities in social and economic participation and 
control.177 Combining the two and claiming to be doing justice to both will no 
doubt be difficult.  
 
In the following chapter, I will investigate whether the policy decisions 
outlined above, which gave rise to the Competition Act, have influenced and 
shaped the decisions of the Competition Tribunal in merger cases. Have the 
competition authorities seized the opportunity to advance the public interest 
cause through its decision making power? It might be illustrative to bear in 
mind that parliament amended the Preamble of the Act in 2000, which deals 
with opening the economy to ‘greater ownership by a greater number of 
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South Africans.’178 Has the Tribunal been bold or has it come to pass, as 
Fox predicted in her article in 2000,  
 
‘[i]f expectations are high that the new competition law will visibly 
change the terms of economic participation of the historically 
repressed black majority in South Africa, they are likely to be 
unfulfilled; the stated purpose of the competition law could give 
false hope?’179 
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their own, they should not be treated as non-scripta, especially since parliament felt it necessary to 
underline and clear up this point by adding the section to the Preamble in 2000, OECD Report 
Competition Law and Policy in South Africa, February 2003, 8. 








As the figures impressively demonstrate,180 the South African 
Competition Tribunal has approved the overwhelming majority of merger 
cases, which have come before it, most of them without conditions.  
 
The Competition Act lists the considerations that may be discussed 
under the public interest heading in merger control cases. According to s 
12A(3), these are the effects the merger will have on a) a particular industrial 
sector or region; b) employment; c) the ability of small businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons to become 
competitive; and d) the ability of national industries to compete in 
international markets. The Tribunal has dealt with all four of these public 
interests, albeit to varying degrees of regularity and intensity. Probably the 
most important and most called upon category has been employment.181 
Other aspects, such as empowerment and sector/industry promotion or 
international competitiveness, have played lesser roles. The Tribunal is also 
still fighting to establish a clear understanding of the functioning of the 
interrelationship between the competitive analysis and the role of public 
interest grounds,182 a problem the Swiss authorities have not experienced 
since the separation of the two issues, as we have seen previously. This 
process of establishment and definition is ongoing, and the stance of the 
Tribunal will continue to be challenged. The following sections will analyse 
the cases in which the public interest test has been applied by examining 
whether the test plays a meaningful role in promoting the much intoned 
public interest and whether there is a discernable rule of the Tribunal. 
                                                 
180 Over 98 per cent, Annual Report of the Competition Tribunal 2003-2004, 15. 
181 Brassey et al (note 109), 275. 




7.2. Substantiality and Merger Specificity 
 
The Competition Act of South Africa, just like its Swiss counterpart, 
requires the public interest grounds advanced to be ‘substantial’.183 In 
addition, the Tribunal has developed a strict rule pertaining to the ‘merger 
specificity’ of the claimed public interests. Although merger specificity is not 
mentioned in the Act itself, from a procedural point of view it is important to 
demonstrate at the outset that the mere fact that the merging parties or 
participants bring into play one of the four listed public interests, this does 
not suffice to engage the Tribunal in a discussion on the actual merits. A 
number of cases have failed to be considered under public interest grounds 
because the assertions of the parties were either not substantial enough or 
not conditional to the transaction under review.184  
 
In the Tongaat - Hulett Group - Transvaal Suiker Bpk merger,185 a 
transaction that the Tribunal eventually prohibited,186 the parties entered the 
whole foursome of public interest defences for their transaction. The Tribunal 
had found that it would be likely that the merger would substantially lessen 
or prevent competition, and that this could not be offset by the claimed pro-
competitive gains.187 The Tribunal furthermore felt that none of the claimed 
gains were in fact benefits, which were ‘sufficiently substantial’ or merger-
specific to countervail the negative effects of the merger. It could not be said 
that they could not possibly take place in the absence of the merger.188 The 
parties advanced economies of scale arguments, claiming that these would 
lead to lowering of production costs in order to support their merger under 
the head of promoting international competitiveness. Not only was this an 
uncharacteristic use of the public interest ground, moreover, it was not 
supported by the evidence at hand. The Tribunal pointed out that the notion 
that the South African sugar millers were small was not true in the 
                                                 
183 S 12A(2)(b); see also JD Group Limited – Ellerine Holdings Limited merger, 78/LM/Jul00. 
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international comparison. It also noted that the smallest of the merging 
parties was actually producing at the lowest cost and that no productive 
efficiencies were to be expected, as there was no plan to consolidate the 
production capacities.189 ‘Broad generalisations’ on these muted advantages 
would not be accepted by the Tribunal.190 
 
In the JD Group Ltd - Ellerine Holdings Ltd merger,191 the Tribunal 
discredited the parties’ averments that the merger would benefit the 
‘unbanked’ (meaning the persons without bank accounts) because of the 
financial services branch of the furniture stores. Despite the fact that it was 
not clear under which one of the public interest grounds this concern could 
fall, the Tribunal nevertheless investigated the claim. It came to the 
resounding conclusion that, contrary to the parties’ claims, the merger would 
in fact lessen competition for credit facilities if the two companies were 
allowed to merge. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the credit facility 
existed before the merger possibility and that it was not contingent on it. The 
argument that franchising some of the stores, which would ‘be beneficial to 
small businesses and create employment opportunities’ was also rejected. 
The Tribunal correctly found that franchising is a means to diversify risk and 
a business strategy not intrinsically linked to mergers.192 
 
In the Schuhman Sasol (South Africa) Ltd - Price’s Daelite (Pty) Ltd 
merger, the Tribunal found that the transaction would lead to a lessening of 
competition, and efficiency gains advanced by the applicants were rejected. 
The Tribunal then brushed aside averments by the parties that the merger 
would improve their ability to penetrate the international markets in the 
absence of any evidence.193 The Tribunal said:  
 
                                                 
189 Ibid, para 115. 
190 Ibid, para 116.  
191 78/LM/Jul00, 31. 
192 Ibid, 30. 
193 23/LM/May01, para 74; international competitiveness was also not a sufficient argument according 
to the Competition Commission’s Report to the South African Reserve Bank regarding the proposed 




‘However, we have not been told how this will be achieved and 
no further weight is given to this bland assertion. It is certainly 
not clear that a successful export strategy requires the merging 
of SCHS [Schuhman Sasol] and PD [Price’s Daelite].’194  
 
Instead, the Tribunal found that the prohibition of the merger would 
actually assist small and medium sized enterprises to enter and expand in the 
market.195 The transaction was thus prohibited. The Tribunal was following a 
strict line in evaluating the public interest grounds advanced by the various 
parties. Evidently, the public interest grounds claimed in favour of a merger 
need to be significant and pointedly dependant on the transaction. This strict 
approach has given the Tribunal much room to manoeuvre and thus avoid 




The major category of public interest considerations is employment and 
the consequences of mergers on the work force. To enhance the role that 
employees and their representative organisations can play, the Competition 
Act provides for the active involvement of trade unions during the merger 
procedure.196 The Act requires the merging parties to inform the registered 
trade unions of the effects of the merger, and gives them procedural 
participation rights in the dealings before the competition authorities. 
 
The Tribunal has adopted a flexible approach with regard to the weight 
afforded to job protection in merger cases. It is understood that, in a country 
with an official unemployment rate of 26.5 per cent,197 the preservation and 
creation of jobs is a major concern. The South African economy has 
undergone dramatic restructuring during the past decade. Since coming out 
of economic isolation, the national industry has steadily increased efficiency 
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196 S 13A(2); for a detailed overview see 
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but at the same time not generated new jobs.198 Job creation and job 
retention in the face of all this industrial turmoil is thus vitally important. 
 
The Tribunal is aware, however, that it cannot merely look at the 
prospect of losing jobs because of a merger. More importantly, it must 
consider the prospect of greater job losses if it does not approve a merger. 
‘We are mindful then that to prohibit the merger on employment grounds 
may have the unintended consequence of exacerbating the employment 
loss’.199 These considerations have surfaced in several of its decisions.200 
Nonetheless, this stance has not clouded the Tribunal’s discernment. There 
have been cases, where the ‘merge to save jobs’ argument has failed.201 
Despite the pressures of employment interests, the Tribunal has not been 
bullied into submission by trade unions with unsubstantiated demands.  
 
In the Bid Industrial Holdings – G Fox & Co (Pty) Ltd merger, the 
Tribunal clearly stated that it would not accept all and any union demands 
above the bona fide undertakings of merging parties to limit job losses 
occasioned because of a merger.202 The Tribunal has also shown reluctance 
to overrule the agreement achieved by the merging parties and unions.203 In 
the Citibank NA South African Branch – Mercantile Bank Limited merger, for 
example, the Tribunal conceded that it did not have an adequate remedy for 
job losses in one of the merging parties, as these had taken place before the 
case came before the Tribunal.204 Despite all these decisions, it remains 
clear that negative employment consequences are regularly at the forefront 
                                                 
198 In fact, South Africa in 1995 generated a GDP of R440bn with a labour force of 13,6m people, 
while in 2004, GDP was R1387bn with a smaller labour force of 11,9m, data from the Statistics South 
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of the list of public interest grounds reviewed and frequently the only serious 
concern.  
 
In the Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited – Stellenbosch Farmers 
Winery Group merger, a consolidation in the wine and spirits sector, the 
Tribunal’s decision eventually hinged on an interpretive issue. The merger 
was contested on several fronts and concerned a field of the South African 
industry that had been characterised by high state intervention and market 
sharing.205 The merging parties submitted that the transaction would enable 
the new entity to benefit from economies of scale and enhance the 
company’s international competitiveness.206 The former was a classical 
‘efficiency defence’, while the latter was one of the less frequently advanced 
public interest grounds listed in the Act.207  
 
The labour unions had claimed that the job losses occasioned by the 
merger amounted to 1182 out of a total of 5828 posts, a percentage of 20, 
that this figure warranted to be considered substantial according to the law, 
and that it should therefore prevent the approval of the merger. The merging 
parties, however, presented the job losses differently and were able to lead 
evidence to the result that out of the 1182 job losses, only a fraction of the 
workforce, namely 164, or 8 per cent, had actually been retrenched.208 In the 
Tribunal’s view, this figure fell well short of what it deemed to constitute a 
‘substantial public interest’, because the employees who had taken voluntary 
retirements and severance packages could not be regarded as ‘adversely 
affected’. The Tribunal thus did not prohibit the merger. In the end, it was the 
lower number of effective dismissals, which gave the merging parties the 
edge. 
 
In the Lonmin Plc – Southern Platinum Corp merger,209 the parties 
again focused their public interest defence on the mitigating effects of the 
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207 See s 12A(3)(d). 
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merger on the employment situation. According to the parties, the merger 
could save 1132 of a total of 1532 jobs.210 Despite this fact, the Commission 
still felt that the 400 envisioned losses constituted a substantial public 
interest. The effects of the merger and the consequent job losses would 
have to be ameliorated by the following: The retrenchments would have to 
be limited to a maximum of 400 persons, which was the worst case scenario 
of the parties; retrenched employees would have to be short-listed for posts 
in Lonmin Plc and a skills training program would have to be introduced for 
the jobless workers. This was also a condition implemented in the next case 
under consideration below.211 In the Lonmin Plc case the negative impact of 
a prohibition and the claimed salvaging effect on jobs in case of approval (73 
per cent job saved) left the Tribunal little room to manoeuvre. At the same 
time, it would seem that the 25 per cent retrenched was already substantial 
enough to warrant intervention. 
 
In one of its most recent cases, the Tribunal has again been put to the 
test as to when it feels compelled to intervene when mergers lead to 
retrenchments. In the Tiger Brands Ltd – Ashton Canning Co (Pty) – Newco 
– Langeberg Food International merger,212 the Tribunal had to consider a 
merger in the canned fruit and fruit puree industry. This was a case where 
the Tribunal found that the merger would undoubtedly lead to a substantial 
lessening or prevention of competition on the local South African market.213 
The merging parties failed to convince the Tribunal that the relevant market 
for their industry was to be considered international. They did manage, 
however, to advance some valid efficiency defences, which had a positive 
impact on the merger and were substantial enough to cancel out the 
negative effects of the limited competition, even though the parties did not 
show that cost reductions would filter through to consumers: ‘The bulk of the 
anti-competitive effect in this merger will be felt in export markets.’214 
                                                 
210 Ibid, para 13, this would have been a saving of 73 per cent of the labour force. 
211 These were the conditions the Tribunal imposed on the merger, ibid, para 15. 
212 46/LM/May05. 
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214 Ibid, para 126, this did not concern the Tribunal because, as the ‘effects doctrine’ of s 3(1) of the 




Although the parties referred to the ‘failing-company’ defence, this was 
never raised separately.215 Nonetheless, because the parties presented 
evidence that pointed in this direction, the Tribunal did investigate whether 
this argument stood up to scrutiny. The Tribunal concluded that, despite 
party statements to the opposite, closure of the participating companies was 
not a believable scenario.216 Although it was a competition consideration, the 
striking of this argument had consequences for the public interest arguments 
raised in favour of the merger by the parties. 
 
The parties advanced three out of four possible public interest defences 
to ensure safe passage for their venture through the perilous competition 
evaluation. The argument of improving the company’s international 
competitiveness, to which I shall return later, was not specifically raised 
under the heading of public interest although this was the primary reason 
advanced in favour of the transaction.217 The parties claimed that the merger 
was beneficial for the region of Ashton and for the SMMEs of the 
surrounding area and above all that it was necessary to save jobs in both of 
the merging entities. Disapproval of the transaction would have led to an 
estimated 273 permanent jobs and 4000 seasonal jobs being lost while, 
according to the parties, approval of the merger would only lead to the loss 
of 45 permanent jobs and 1000 seasonal posts.218 
 
Despite the proposition of three separate public interest reasons in 
favour of the transaction, in reality, because of their linkage, the real 
question turned on the substantiality of the ‘jobs lost – jobs saved’ argument. 
The Tribunal then also did not deal with each of the public interests 
separately but focussed on the employment issue. It was clear that any 
retrenchments in the village of Ashton would inevitably lead to greater 
impoverishment of the region as a whole, with negative knock-on effects for 
the small supporting industries of the town and area. In addition, the Tribunal 
                                                 
215 Ibid, para 71. 
216 Ibid, para 75 and 79.  
217 This aspect is dealt with below in section 7.5. 




argued that the region-SSME defence was derived from the failing firm 
defence, which it had dismissed earlier. 
 
The Tribunal returned to the naked figures of retrenchments, which 
were disputed neither by the parties nor by the Commission.219 It came to 
the unqualified conclusion that the ‘merger will have a substantially negative 
effect on employment and hence the public interest.’220 It would not be 
possible to approve of the merger unconditionally.  
 
The Commission had taken up the parties’ suggestion to approve the 
merger under the condition that a fund be set up to assist the released 
workers in retraining.221 The parties had envisaged to inject the fund with 
R250.000.00. The Commission favoured a significantly higher amount of 
R2m, and also wanted the money to benefit the unemployed persons of the 
Ashton region in general. The Tribunal considered both suggestions and 
concluded that both the amount and the modalities of the suggestion were 
deficient. A fund as contemplated by the Commission would have turned the 
firm ‘into an enlarged welfare agency’, and would have caused conflict 
among the various groupings of unemployed of Ashton, some of which 
would feel unfairly dealt with in having to share the fund’s spoils with 
‘ordinary’ unemployed persons who had not worked for the cannery.222  
 
The Tribunal then turned to the suggested amount of R250.000.00 and 
heavily criticised the attempts of the parties to remedy the negative 
employment effects with such a paltry amount. With one thousand 
retrenchments, this would have resulted in R250.00 being invested per 
person in the retraining of the previous employees. The Tribunal spoke 
plainly of what it held of the proposal: ‘As a contribution to their retraining it is 
                                                 
219 Note that in this case again the figures suggested by the relevant labour union and the numbers 
advanced by the parties differed considerably, with the former claiming that 10 – 15 per cent of 
permanent posts would be lost, while the parties put this figure at less than 10 per cent, for seasonal 
workers the union claimed a loss of approximately 15 – 20 per cent, while the parties had this figure at 
a much lower 7 per cent, see 46/LM/May05 para 138 and 140.  
220 Ibid, para 143. 
221 Ibid, para 144. 




as wanting in utility as it is in its generosity.’223 The parties claimed being 
stretched to the limit financially with the first offer. This smacked of 
deceitfulness. Tiger Brands, the majority shareholder of the special purpose 
vehicle set up to hold the merging companies, had reported increased 
revenues of R15.3bn for the past financial year and a jump of 45 per cent in 
net profits to R1.56bn.224 The Tribunal consequently dismissed this 
argument without further contemplation, and agreed with the Commission 
that a R2m fund should be established, noting cynically that the poverty 
argument ‘ill befits a firm that has, post merger, pretensions to be a national 
champion, let alone a firm that boasts one of the country’s major 
conglomerates as its two thirds shareholder.’225 The Tribunal made the 
merger conditional on the R2m fund and noted that this was to be 
considered to be on the low end of the acceptable spectrum if anything.226 
The parties agreed. The above shows that, in the proceedings before the 
Tribunal, there is clearly an inherent element of gamble and risk. The 
Tribunal called the bluff of the parties with regard to their limited financial 
means – and suddenly the resources for the retraining fund could be 
increased by a factor of eight.  
 
The above case does make it clear that addressing the public interest 
of employment properly and adequately in a transaction is vital before a 
merger will be approved. It also shows that, despite substantial negative 
employment effects, parties are able to influence and ameliorate the 
situation with adequate and constructive ancillary concessions. The decision 
also shows that these concessions need to be of equivalent substance and 
not betray the seriousness of the harsh realities for the workforce that is 
without work and income in a country stunted by this problem.227 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal evidently does not want to stand in the way of 
mergers unnecessarily, and in cases where the numbers are in a grey area 
                                                 
223 Ibid, para 148.  
224 See Annual Report 2005 of Tiger Brands Ltd, which also shows an increase in dividends of 35 per 
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225 46/LM/May05, para 149.  
226 Ibid, para 150.  
227 Amidst the criticism of the value of the fund, Tiger Brands has announced a staff empowerment 




as here, a solid and generous offer might well tilt the scales towards 
approval. 
 
In the latest published case of the Tribunal, Business Investment 
Ventures No 976 (Pty) Limited – Sage Group (Pty) Limited,228 the authority 
passed a merger despite substantial negative effects on employment. As in 
the previously discussed cases, the parties claimed that, in the absence of 
the merger, the job losses would be more severe than under the merger. In 
addition, the parties offered a ‘retrenchment plan’, which included the 
redeployment of retrenched workers in the merged group of companies, 
voluntary retrenchment and retraining programs. This convinced the Tribunal 





Empowerment is an ongoing concern in all spheres of South African 
society and also one that has preoccupied the Tribunal, albeit to a lesser 
degree than one might have expected.230 The fact that black economic 
empowerment (BEE) is being promoted in many sectors of the South African 
industry, either by the industry itself or under the guidance of the relevant 
ministries,231 has taken some of the pressure off the competition authorities 
to force this issue. The question is, however, whether the Tribunal is using 
the existence of this initiative as a convenient reason for not interfering. 
 
An early attempt by the Commission to advance the cause of black 
economic empowerment was evident in the conditions it had proposed for 
the merger between JD Group Limited and Ellerine Holdings Limited.232 The 
Commission had suggested that the proposed divesture of 150 stores 
should be preferably offered to a BEE Group. The Tribunal was unconvinced 
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that this measure could have offset the detriment to competition; it also 
criticised the lack of details as to how such divestment would occur and 
eventually prohibited the transaction. 
 
In the Clidet 323 (Pty) Ltd – MCG Industries (Pty) Ltd merger,233 the 
Tribunal found that the empowerment opportunities opened by the merger 
were an additional reason to approve it, over and above the fact that the 
merger was deemed to be beyond suspicion from a competition point of 
view. One must bear in mind that this consideration is not superfluous, as it 
might be considered under Swiss law, as in South Africa, as discussed 
previously, a merger cleared under competitive considerations is not home 
free. Public interest concerns can still catch up with a case and lead to its 
downfall. The finding in the Clident 323 (Pty) Ltd case shows that the 
Tribunal is careful not to let this aspect slip out of the focus of the parties and 
the authorities merely because a merger might seem uncontentious at first 
glance because of its neutral effect on competition.  
 
In a similar case, the Tribunal quelled any rising competition fears with 
the positive prospects that the merger would have on ‘boosting black 
economic empowerment’.234 In the Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd – Tepco 
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd merger case,235 the Commission was concerned about 
the effects of the exit of the selling entity Thebe, a company controlled by 
historically disadvantaged persons, which would result from the sale of its 
interest in Tepco.  
 
The Commission, while in favour of the transaction as a whole, was 
worried about the message sent out if the merger was approved without 
some conditions to safeguard the stake of historically disadvantaged 
persons. This was a case where a pro-competitive merger was under threat 
from negative public interest fears. On the other hand, the Commission 
realised that suggesting the prohibition of the merger would have defeated 
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both the commercial aspirations of the Thebe shareholders and the goal of 
Shell to take positive steps towards empowerment as demanded by the 
industry charter.236  
 
The structures and conditions suggested by the Commission would 
have seriously altered the underlying rationale of the transaction. The 
Tribunal thus did not sanction the conditions of the Commission and 
approved of the transaction unconditionally. It held that empowerment would 
not be assisted by forcing empowerment companies to hold onto 
investments, against their better commercial judgment.237 This would lead to 
those persons originally targeted for advancement paying the price of policy 
meddling.238  
 
‘The Commission’s role, after all, is to promote and protect 
competition and a specified public interest. It is not to second-guess 
the commercial decisions of precisely that element of the public that 
it is enjoined to defend.’  
 
This was especially pertinent as in the present case there was no threat 
to competition.239 In the above case, then, the Tribunal again used the 
opportunity to limit itself and the perception of competition law as an 
instrument to advance effective empowerment. The Commission had 
attempted to make the merger conditional on some binding commitment of 
the entities to promote entrance of non-whites into management. The Tribunal 
confronted these demands with the accustomed hesitancy. It referred to the 
presented programs for capacity building and skills development of 
historically disadvantaged persons, as well as the proposed transition 
committee within the company. It maintained that  
                                                 
236 The transaction would have led to Thebe’s shares in Tepco being sold to Shell Marketing SA in 
exchange for a 17 per cent stake in the acquiring firm, setting Shell South Africa firmly on course of 
the goal of a 25 per cent participation by formally disadvantaged shareholders as set out in the 
Petroleum Industry Charter, available under www.sapia/org/za/pubs/charter.htm; the transaction also 
provided for the Thebe shareholders to appoint a director to the board of Shell South Africa, Ibid, para 
6; for a detailed account of the transaction see 66/LM/Oct01, para 3 – 6. 
237 Ibid, para 42; see also OECD Commentary (note 149), 18. 
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‘we are however sceptical of the ability of the Competition 
authorities to play a meaningful role in securing these laudable 
objectives and we are extremely concerned at the prospect of 
generating, in the process, a range of wholly unintended 
consequences.’240  
 
This fear has permeated many of the Tribunals decisions. I do not 
doubt that the Tribunal could play a very meaningful role in promoting the 
public interest if it wanted to. In the Tepco merger, the Tribunal was 
eventually vindicated by the parties, especially Thebe, which wholly 
supported the transaction and pleaded strongly for not losing sight of the 
fact that what was good for Tepco’s shareholders in Thebe in particular, was 
eventually good for historically disadvantaged persons and for 
empowerment in general. Thebe’s CEO put it concisely when he stated:  
 
‘the question is, is it Tepco that must be made more competitive or 
it is Thebe that must be made more competitive? If Thebe can 
compromise certain things about Tepco in order to gain an added 
economic advantage for Thebe, which is a historically 
disadvantaged company acting on sectors broader than just the 
petroleum sector, yes. Thebe becomes more competitive as a black 
owned company. I don’t have problems in making that decision 
because I know that we will be empowered and I can actually 
demonstrate through our BEE approach that we are a much more 
vibrant BEE company after the transaction, than before the 
transaction, at a Thebe level.’241 
 
This pragmatism is a recurring feature of the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal to date. In one of the harder fought merger battles between the 
merger parties and the Industrial Development Corporation,242 the Tribunal 
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had to decide whether it permitted a merger between Anglo American 
Holdings Ltd and Kumba Resources Ltd in the light of empowerment 
averments.  
 
The Tribunal concluded that, as a starting point, there were no reasons 
to prevent the merger, as it did not raise any anti-competitive issues and as 
no lessening or prevention of competition was to be expected from the 
merger. As both Anglo American and the IDC invoked public interest 
grounds for their sides of the story, the Tribunal reiterated its method of 
evaluating cases with diametrically opposed public interest arguments.243 
The Tribunal would review the substantiality of each of the claimed public 
interests separately to see whether these were indeed compelling. Then it 
would assess whether, given their importance, they were mutually exclusive 
and contradictory without a chance of reconciliation. Lastly, it would balance 
the two or more established public interests to come to ‘a net conclusion’.  
 
Anglo American, having won the ‘competition round’, advanced several 
reasons over and above the pro-competitive reasons listed at the outset of 
its submission to the Tribunal in an attempt to outweigh any negative public 
interest concerns put forward by the IDC. Anglo American proposed sector 
benefit arguments, which will be examined later under the section 7.6 on 
Sector and Region Protection. 
 
The IDC wanted the merger to be prohibited because, in its view, it ran 
contrary to the objectives of the Act, particularly the ability of historically 
disadvantaged persons to become competitive according to s 12A(3)(c). The 
IDC advanced a purposive interpretation of the section, in keeping with the 
spirit of the whole Act and the Preamble. It demanded that s 12A(3)(c) be 
read together with s 2(f) of the Act, which expressly claims that one of the 
purposes of the Act was ‘to promote a greater spread of ownership in 
particular to increase the ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged 
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persons’.244 The IDC argued for the prohibition of the merger because 
unopposed it would lead to the further strengthening the economic grip of a 
company that was already one of the most powerful in the country.245 The 
IDC strongly advocated that the Tribunal should seize the opportunity 
offered to it by the reorganisation of Iscor to ‘further the goal of 
empowerment’.246 It alleged that this restructuring was a pivotal moment in 
the country’s economic development, and held that it was an opportunity for 
historically disadvantaged persons to ‘get their hands on such a strategic 
asset.247 
 
To its detriment, the IDC could not convince the Tribunal that it had a 
viably financed offer by an empowerment consortium in the wings to snap up 
the target firm in preference to Anglo American.248 The Tribunal, although 
sympathetic to the fears raised by the IDC, stated that in the absence of a 
realistic alternative bid for the share in Kumba, it had no option but to let the 
merger pass. The Tribunal even went so far as to adopt the reasoning of the 
IDC but then put the finger on the weakness of the corporation’s argument. 
Even if it could rally enough support for a bid, there would be no guarantee 
that the shareholders would be willing to sell. The Tribunal called the IDC’s 
scheme ‘wholly speculative’.249 It also stated that prohibiting the merger 
would not advance the cause of previously disenfranchised citizens, as then 
the status quo, which was no more favourable, would remain. The third 
option suggested by the IDC, which included a whole list of conditions for the 
merger approval, was not considered by the Tribunal, for procedural and 
substantive reasons.250 
                                                 
244 46/LM/Jan02, para 147 and 150, interestingly the IDC did not invoke s 9 (2) of the Constitution, 
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The Tribunal then considered the value of the averment by the IDC 
that, by permitting the merger, ‘it would close the door on increasing the 
ownership of historically disadvantaged persons in Kumba’.251 The Tribunal 
disagreed with the IDC and clearly stated that the undertakings of Anglo 
American did not support the notion of the corporation that the merger would 
have ‘an irreversible impact on the ability of historically disadvantaged 
persons to acquire a meaningful stake in Kumba’. It based this opinion on 
two facts: Firstly, it held that the Mining Charter, to which Anglo American 
was a signatory party, required it to pursue an empowerment strategy for 
previously disadvantaged persons.252 Secondly, it cited the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Anglo American and the government, in which both 
expressed their commitment to expand iron ore mining in the Northern Cape 
region, while including an empowerment facet.253 The Tribunal noted that, 
although this was not the empowerment path envisaged by the IDC, it was in 
no way inferior.254 Obviously, there is no magic formula to promote 
empowerment. 
 
In effect, the Tribunal refuted the substantiality of the IDC’s claim and 
thus was able to abandon the notorious and complex balancing procedure. 
After their victory, the merging parties did not rest on their laurels. Two years 
after the Tribunal decision, Kumba Resources has transformed its 
shareholding and set up a BEE holding company, which owns the majority in 
a special purpose vehicle, which holds three quarters of the shares of 
Kumba Iron Ore Company.255 This case, to which I shall return later in 
section 7.7 under Policy Reluctance and Deference, might have had a 
different result and forged new ground for the public interest causes, if the 
IDC had been better prepared and if it had concerned a less ‘formidable’ 
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adversary, who was on the better side of the arguments because of its 
commendable social responsibility256 and progressive approach to black 
economic empowerment.257 Maybe it would have been more difficult for the 
Tribunal to dismiss the IDC’s suggestions, which it found ‘sympathetic’ by its 
own accounts, if the IDC’s corporate bankers had sat ready with a cheque 
with enough of a premium to entice the Anglo American shareholders to 
enter into the sale. 
 
7.5. International Competitiveness 
 
This public interest ground is infrequently invoked. In the previously 
mentioned case Distillers Corporation (SA) Limited – Stellenbosch Farmers 
Winery Group Ltd,258 the merging parties suggested that the merger would 
assist the new company to penetrate international markets. The Commission 
followed the parties on this argument in its submission to the Tribunal and 
believed that any possible anti-competitive effects of the merger could be 
vindicated by the anticipated amplification of the new company’s 
competitiveness. The Tribunal was not convinced by these averments, and 
put to the parties that the claimed better marketing ability for South African 
wine and spirits internationally did not depend on the two companies actually 
merging, but that it could also be achieved without being an economic 
unit.259 
 
In the previously discussed Tiger Brands Ltd – Ashton Canning Co 
(Pty) – Newco – Langeberg Food International merger,260 the Tribunal had to 
consider a merger in the canned fruit and fruit puree industry. The parties 
had asserted that the merger was necessary for their companies to remain 
competitive internationally, as the South African fruit canning industry had 
been under increased and continuing pressure to compete in the world due 
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to the strengthening of the local currency, which had made South African 
produce more expensive for foreign importers, and the existence of steep 
import barriers in the northern industrialised nations in the forms of import 
duties. The Tribunal did not accept this as sufficient reason to 
counterbalance the negative effects of the merger. 
 
This argument has not been advanced since and it would seem that 
despite the strength of the South African currency since 2004, merger 
parties have not resorted to pinning their hopes on convincing the Tribunal 
that anti-competitive effects would be warranted because of improved 
international market access. 
 
7.6. Sector and Region Protection 
 
In the Naspers Limited – Educational Investment Corporation Limited 
merger,261 the Tribunal found that the transaction would substantially reduce 
competition in the educational medium sector, a part of industry that, the 
Tribunal agreed, was of paramount importance for society.262 In addition, the 
efficiency gains claimed were not specific to the merger.263 Despite these 
problems, the merger was cleared under the condition that the merged entity 
was to ‘identify and participate in joint programs with the Department of 
Education aimed at building capacity in public education’. In retrospect, this 
was an obligation that seems rather vague and hard to enforce in the face of 
the dangerous potential consequences but it sufficed to clear the 
transaction.  
 
In the Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd – Transvaal Suiker Bpk case,264 which 
the Tribunal eventually prohibited, the parties tried to sway the authorities by 
suggesting that the merger would benefit the Mpumalanga region and 
advance empowerment by selling crop land to small scale farmers from 
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historically disadvantaged backgrounds. The Tribunal held that these 
assurances were not substantial enough to outweigh the negative impacts of 
the merger,265 nor did the Tribunal accept that these assurances were 
merger specific. 
 
In the Anglo American – Kumba case mentioned before, Anglo 
American listed the proposed investments of the company in the Northern 
Cape region and the knock-on effects on the local economy as regional 
public interest grounds in favour of the merger.266 In the view of the Tribunal, 
the lack of certainty and the non-binding nature of the promises made by 
Anglo American, these arguments were not valid. In the case at hand, 
however, it ultimately did not matter, as the public interests did not 
countervail the positive effects of the merger. 
 
To date there has been only one case in which a negative public 
interest finding has managed to prohibit a proposed merger. In the Iscor Ltd 
– Saldanha Steel (Pty) Ltd merger,267 the Tribunal found conclusively that 
the merger would have anti-competitive effects. However, the Tribunal 
believed that disallowing the merger was not an option under the 
circumstances, because of regional public interest grounds at stake. 
Saldanha Steel had been a good corporate citizen in the region and was a 
vital part of Saldanha’s economic life. ‘The failure of the transaction would in 
all probability lead to a closure temporarily or permanent of the firm, and with 
that a devastating impact on the region.’268 
 
Obviously, it takes quite a bit to tilt the scale away from a competitive 
merger, just as it takes the life of a whole region to ‘impugn a merger found 
not to be anti-competitive.’  
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7.7. Policy Reluctance and Deference 
 
Despite the political run-up to the Act and the hopes of many politicians 
that the competition authorities would be able to change the economic 
landscape by means of their rulings, there has been great reluctance on 
behalf of the Commission and Tribunal to force through such efforts. This is 
in itself not surprising if one recalls that the DTI explained as far back as 
1997 that ‘the public interest in competition law is defined through its 
relationship to Government's broader economic policy’, and that it can never 
be distilled independently.269 The reluctance by the Tribunal to interfere with 
public interest concerns that are also dealt with by legislation has been 
formative in its jurisprudence and seems to be restraining any pro-active 
approach to forcing the advancement of these interests.  
 
In the Tepco – Shell case mentioned above, the Tribunal concluded its 
analysis with these enlightening words:  
 
‘The role played by the competition authorities in defending even 
those aspects of the public interest listed in the Act is, at most, 
secondary to other statutory and regulatory instruments – in this 
case the Employment Equity Act, the Skills Development Act and 
the Charter itself immediately spring to mind. The competition 
authorities, however well intentioned, are well advised not to pursue 
their public interest mandate in an over-zealous manner lest they 
damage precisely those interests that they ostensibly seek to 
protect.’270 
 
In the Distillers Corporation Ltd – Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group 
merger, the Tribunal positioned itself by explaining that ‘competition 
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authorities do not exercise […] public interest determinations in a void’.271 It 
was referring to the fact that in many instances Parliament has legislated 
concerns dealt with in the Competition Act. It explicated that, in these 
situations, its jurisdiction was ‘secondary’ and any remaining public interest 
concerns had to be substantial to warrant interference.272  
 
‘Thus in this case where the public interest asserted is employment, 
if it could be demonstrated that the merger specific employment 
effects are so adverse that no other law or regulator can remedy 
them, then we would be obliged to intervene to either prohibit or set 
conditions on the approval.’273  
 
Contrary to the Tribunal’s opinion, I believe it is hardly imaginable that 
a situation could arise, which could not be remedied with an appropriate and 
drastic new law. This would in effect mean that the competition authorities 
would never be obliged to intervene. This approach greatly limits the reach 
of competition authorities to define policy, or rather; it gives them the 
freedom to study in a case-by-case fashion the facts of each merger before 
them and to consider any legislative attempts to redress public interest 
inequities.  
 
The Tribunal followed up this decision with an even more overt 
statement regarding its secondary role. In the merger case Daun Cie AG 
and Kolosus Holdings Ltd,274 the Tribunal went on to say that ‘it is incumbent 
on an unelected, administrative tribunal, principally charged with defending 
and promoting competition, to approach its public interest mandate with 
great circumspection.’275 The Tribunal conceded that it did have to consider 
public interest grounds and that it was not about to ‘shy away from tough 
decisions’. At the same time, it also suggested that the Tribunal’s role was  
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‘at most […] ancillary to these other statutes and institutions; it is 
supportive of their general thrust and should, by and large, not be 
employed as a substitute for, and in order to second guess, these 
other interventions.’276  
 
The Tribunal went to great lengths to explain the democratic merits of 
the legislative process and unequivocally stated,  
 
‘it cannot be that the legislature, having painstakingly constructed a 
comprehensive statutory framework for industrial relations, 
intended that an administrative tribunal, with no expertise or 
standing, should impose its own framework and substantive 
provisions on a firm that came before it in order to have a merger 
adjudicated.’277  
 
The Tribunal stressed that, if it were to meddle too intensely in ‘the 
realm of industrial relations’, it would ‘significantly extend the public interest 
mandate and would, moreover, court conflict in a sensitive area for which 
we have only a limited responsibility or technical competence.’278 What a 
change from the original revolutionary promises six years earlier.The 
Tribunal has voluntarily reduced itself to a secondary body with ‘no 
expertise or standing’. In its Distillers Corporation decision, the Tribunal 
reaffirmed this stance, when it stated that, ‘Parliament has in many 
instances enacted legislation that deals quite specifically with the issues 
referred to in s 12(A)(3) and employment is no exception’. It further said 
that, ‘other statutes and institutions that they create, are better placed and 
resourced to deal directly and effectively with these issues than are 
we, given that our discretion is described in s 12A(3) at a high level 
of abstraction and generality.’279  
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As the labour authorities had already cleared the appeals against the 
dismissals occasioned by the merger and found in the favour of the merging 
parties, the Tribunal said that it was not its role to act as a supplementary 
regulator.280 All of a sudden the Tribunal is no longer a specialised agency 
of government with skill and expertise but a secondary body with limits to its 
capabilities. It has come to see itself more as an ancillary afterthought to 
competition values than the guardian of the public interest on an equal 
footing. This begs the question whether the competition authorities are mere 
competition implementers and not policy makers? Why does the Act then 
contain a section on ‘public interest’? The OECD report is quite blunt about 
this:  
 
‘General concerns about the structure of the political economy have 
not been elements of merger control, despite the prominence of 
these issues in the debate about the law in the 1990s. The 
Commission and the Tribunal take a standard competition-policy 
approach to merger analysis and actions. Concerns about 
aggregate concentration and pyramid-like investment structures, 
although still of some interest, have not been issues in deciding 
particular cases.’281 
 
In the Anglo American – Kumba merger mentioned above, Anglo 
American for obvious reasons implored the Tribunal to stay true to its limited 
mandate. It warned that ‘to follow the approach of the IDC would be to 
interpret the Act not only in a manner contrary to its ordinary language, but 
also in a manner with dangerous policy consequences. Such an 
interpretation would transform the Competition Act from an anti-trust statute, 
albeit with a public interest aspect,282 into an unchecked vehicle for 
redistribution’,283 something that parliament could never have wanted to do. 
It paraphrased the Tribunal’s stance in previous cases, when it advanced the 
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‘primacy argument’, and stated that the government’s policy decisions, in 
this case restructuring the nation’s ownership structure in the extractive 
industries through the Mining Charter, should not be pre-empted by 
decisions of the Tribunal. It repeated that the Tribunal’s authority could be 
secondary at most.284 It would seem that businesses are willing to deal with 
policy evolution in parliament – a forum where industry can lobby policy 
makers and influence decisions. Fighting an activist Tribunal might prove 
more difficult.  
 
In this case, big business eventually won the day, mainly due to the 
lack of proper evidence presented by the IDC to bolster its case and owing 
to the fact that Anglo American had been exemplary its in empowerment 
endeavours and that it was in compliance with the government initiated 
Mining Charter.285 The Tribunal did not accept the IDC’s fear that, by 
permitting the merger, historically disadvantaged persons would suffer 
irreversibly in their ability to get a foot in the economic door. The Tribunal did 
not, however, exclude the possibility of ever changing its approach, merely 
stating that in the present case, mainly due to the evidentiary deficiencies, it 
would not deviate from its previous jurisprudence.286 
 
In one of its most recent rulings, the Tribunal has reverted to its more 
conservative earlier stance. In the Edgars Consolidated Stores (Pty) Ltd – 
Rapid Dawn 123 (Pty) Ltd merger,287 it dismissed applications by the 
relevant sector trade union to impose on the merged entity a limit with regard 
to the amounts of textiles and clothing it was permitted to import from 
overseas. The trade union feared that Edgars Consolidated, with its 
increased market share, would source more of its supplies from abroad.288 
The Tribunal announced that it would approach such a demand with the 
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usual ‘considerable circumspection’.289 Imposing limitations on commercial 
considerations would inevitably hurt consumer welfare290 and would promote 
the interests of Edgars’ competitors at the expense of the company. Such 
limitations belong into the realm of trade negotiations and market access 




As indicated, the Tribunal is very strict on separating politics from 
competition, even though the dividing line is unclear. As previously 
mentioned I do not believe it is at all possible to divide the two concerns, 
especially in a country such as South Africa where every law is made by 
politicians with vastly differing backgrounds and every policy discussion is 
based on laws that have, for the better or the worse, shaped the country. 
After all, law is just politics laid down in rules. Hartzenberg seems to 
disagree, 
 
‘There may be occasions where the promotion of public interest 
objectives will be better served by other policy interventions than 
competition policy, and the competition authorities should be bold 
enough to hold back on such decisions.’292  
 
Is the Tribunal bold by its reluctance? History will tell whether this was 
the right approach. I fear it will prove to have been the wrong option. 
Harzenberg feels that such a cautious approach will enhance the standing 
and credibility of the Tribunal.293 No doubt, the South African competition 
authorities are at the start of a long and testing path to their acceptance and 
stature in the country. I doubt, however, that the tentative role the Tribunal 
has played in promoting the public interest, in the few cases where it has 
been raised, will truly enhance its renown.  
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This paper has shown that the Swiss and South African systems, 
although they come from different legislative backgrounds, have similar aims 
and are tackling similar problems. Both have been themed to be instruments 
for promoting the public interest. Both are viewed as measures to promote 
growth and integration into the global economy, and both are fighting archaic 
structures grown from isolation.  
 
The Swiss have put in place a well-balanced and finely tuned system to 
deal with the delicate and contentious issue of public interests. In practise, 
however, it seems that despite the division of duties among the competition 
authorities, the real battle is winning the efficiency arguments beforehand. 
The fact that there has been only one application to the Federal Council 
under the 1995 Act seems to be an indication that the exemptions available 
under the Act are either underutilised or unnecessary.294 In addition to that, 
the fact that the decided case and the one that might still be decided, have 
both raised ‘cultural diversity’ concerns, illustrates the contrasts between the 
two systems. Although Swiss law does not mention any public interest in the 
Act, when one contrasts the cases against the public interest the 
Competition Tribunal has to wrestle with, the difference becomes quite 
glaring. On the one hand stands the valid cause of cultural diversity, and on 
the other, there is employment, equity, sector and regional survival and 
international competitiveness. It is no wonder that the Federal Tribunal has 
not found it necessary to give its stamp of approval to a system, which 
overprices music notes or books. As long as they remain reasonably 
accessible, the Council will not override the competition finding, a decision 
which I find sound. 
 
In the South African context, there is much more at stake than cultural 
diversity. The public interests here go much deeper and seek to heal much 
more severe wounds. In view of this, it is surprising and to a degree even 
                                                 




worrying that the South African authorities are still finding it necessary to 
hide behind formalistic arguments, political deference and self-imposed 
limits, and that they have not been bold enough to test the limits of their 
policy making, or at least policy influencing, powers in order to advance that 
society. 
 
In the South African context, the fact that only one merger has been 
prohibited thus far because of public interest grounds would indicate that the 
competition authorities are still very hesitant to wield their ‘policy power’ and 
that they are deferent to the wisdom of commerce and politics. ‘The 
development dimension does appear in some of the Competition Act’s goals 
and criteria […], but these issues have been second-order matters in 
practice’, according to the OECD.’295 As the DTI opined in its Guidelines in 
1997, ‘some competition policy features may displease some more than 
others’.296 It seems that to date big business and the large conglomerates of 
the ‘old days’ have fared rather well under the new Act. The fear that the 
competition authorities would champion public interest grounds with 
excessive fervour in an attempt to set right the skewed South African 
economic landscape has not happened. In its Distillers Corporation (SA) 
Limited – Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group Ltd decision, the Tribunal 
resigned itself to fighting present and future battles: ‘[…] we cannot use the 
provisions of the Competition Act to turn the clock back to redeem, ex post 
facto, the sins of the past […]’.297 
 
Why does this matter? Why is the advancement of the economic 
stature of historically disadvantaged persons imperative, and why is 
combating chronic and depressing unemployment so central for the stability 
and future harmony of all stakeholders in this new nation? Why is promoting 
sectors and regions in South Africa vital, and why is the international 
standing of the country important? Why are these public interests more 
crucial, more decisive than cultural diversity in Switzerland? Why is it 
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acceptable for the Swiss Federal Tribunal to set the standard for the public 
interest exceedingly high and why is it worrying if the competition authorities 
of South Africa do the same?  
 
The public interest advancement in South Africa, I am arguing, is 
particularly important because a decade after the democratic miracle in 
South Africa the optimism of the world and the citizens of South Africa needs 
to backed up by positive evidence. After twelve years of reconciliation, the 
enthusiasm needs to be supplemented by progress before it ebbs away. The 
millions of poor unemployed South Africans, who have been promised that 
their joint future with all of their fellow citizens will be better under a new 
dispensation, have waited patiently – a patience, which is remarkable under 
the circumstances, a patience, which is fed by goodwill and forgiveness. It is 
a patience, which could prove perilous to put on hold indefinitely.  
 
Not taking away anything from the successes of government and the 
achievements of private business in their joint attempts to alleviate poverty, 
advance the common good and build a nation, my fear is that it might be too 
little progress for such a long period. Government is frequently hampered in 
its service delivery and transformation efforts due to personnel and capacity 
constraints. With their competition authorities, who have been put into place 
to care for the public good, not on a secondary level, but on an equal par 
with competition concerns, government has a competent and able body that 
could and should make progress in small parts of our economy with strong 
signalling effect. To date, the competition authorities have not made use of 
this opportunity. Granted, one does not want an activist, pro-public interest 
panel, which has no regard for the real competition questions. South Africa 
can ill-afford to lose its positive recognition in a world of fickle and mobile 
international investors. To date, the decisions by the Commission and the 
Tribunal have been very sound and well-received internationally from a 
competition point of view.298 At the same time, I believe, South Africa needs 
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authorities, who are more willing to make use of their mandate in a positive 
manner for the greater good. I believe that a little more public interest 
promotion would be a good investment for South Africa in the end to 
overcome the adverse and challenging inequalities that still abound. 
 
After a decade of democracy in South Africa, the figures on black economic 
empowerment are still discouraging.299 After more than ten years of 
appealing to the goodwill and understanding of corporate South Africa, the 
government is adopting a stricter tone. Maybe this new tide will also see 
some more policy decisions by the competition authorities. The Tribunal will 
be all too aware of the fact that this tide may be difficult to stem once the 
proverbial floodgates have been opened. As it has itself warned on previous 
occasions: ‘We are extremely concerned at the prospect of generating, in 
the process, a range of wholly unintended consequences.’300 Although it is 
true that fear is a weak basis for laying down important judgments and 
formulating policy for a transforming country, it is just as vital for this process 
to have authorities with enough foresight to look beyond the immediate 
consequences of their judgments and into the future. Else I fear that the 
words of the Freedom Charter will remain elusive and  
 
‘our country will never be prosperous or free until all our people 
live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and opportunities.’301 
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